CryptoDB
Parameter-Hiding Order Revealing Encryption
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| Presentation: | Slides |
| Conference: | ASIACRYPT 2018 |
| Abstract: | Order-revealing encryption (ORE) is a primitive for outsourcing encrypted databases which allows for efficiently performing range queries over encrypted data. Unfortunately, a series of works, starting with Naveed et al. (CCS 2015), have shown that when the adversary has a good estimate of the distribution of the data, ORE provides little protection. In this work, we consider the case that the database entries are drawn identically and independently from a distribution of known shape, but for which the mean and variance are not (and thus the attacks of Naveed et al. do not apply). We define a new notion of security for ORE, called parameter-hiding ORE, which maintains the secrecy of these parameters. We give a construction of ORE satisfying our new definition from bilinear maps. |
BibTeX
@inproceedings{asiacrypt-2018-29142,
title={Parameter-Hiding Order Revealing Encryption},
booktitle={Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2018},
series={Lecture Notes in Computer Science},
publisher={Springer},
volume={11272},
pages={181-210},
doi={10.1007/978-3-030-03326-2_7},
author={David Cash and Feng-Hao Liu and Adam O'Neill and Mark Zhandry and Cong Zhang},
year=2018
}