International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research


Sunoo Park

Affiliation: MIT


Fully Deniable Interactive Encryption 📺
Deniable encryption (Canetti \emph{et al.}, Crypto 1996) enhances secret communication over public channels, providing the additional guarantee that the secrecy of communication is protected even if the parties are later coerced (or willingly bribed) to expose their entire internal states: plaintexts, keys and randomness. To date, constructions of deniable encryption --- and more generally, interactive deniable communication --- only address restricted cases where only {\em one} party is compromised (Sahai and Waters, STOC 2014). The main question --- whether deniable communication is at all possible if {\em both} parties are coerced at once --- has remained open. We resolve this question in the affirmative, presenting a communication protocol that is {\em fully deniable} under coercion of both parties. Our scheme has three rounds, assumes subexponentially secure indistinguishability obfuscation and one-way functions, and uses a short global reference string that is generated once at system set-up and suffices for an unbounded number of encryptions and decryptions. Of independent interest, we introduce a new notion called \emph{off-the-record deniability}, which protects parties even when their claimed internal states are inconsistent (a case not covered by prior definitions). Our scheme satisfies both standard deniability and off-the-record deniability.
It Wasn’t Me! 📺
Sunoo Park Adam Sealfon
Ring signatures, introduced by [RST01], are a variant of digital signatures which certify that one among a particular set of parties has endorsed a message while hiding which party in the set was the signer. Ring signatures are designed to allow anyone to attach anyone else’s name to a signature, as long as the signer’s own name is also attached. But what guarantee do ring signatures provide if a purported signatory wishes to denounce a signed message—or alternatively, if a signatory wishes to later come forward and claim ownership of a signature? Prior security definitions for ring signatures do not give a conclusive answer to this question: under most existing definitions, the guarantees could go either way. That is, it is consistent with some standard definitions that a non-signer might be able to repudiate a signature that he did not produce, or that this might be impossible. Similarly, a signer might be able to later convincingly claim that a signature he produced is indeed his own, or not. Any of these guarantees might be desirable. For instance, a whistleblower might have reason to want to later claim an anonymously released signature, or a person falsely implicated in a crime associated with a ring signature might wish to denounce the signature that is framing them and damaging their reputation. In other circumstances, it might be desirable that even under duress, a member of a ring cannot produce proof that he did or did not sign a particular signature. In any case, a guarantee one way or the other seems highly desirable.In this work, we formalize definitions and give constructions of the new notions of repudiable, unrepudiable, claimable, and unclaimable ring signatures. Our repudiable construction is based on VRFs, which are implied by several number-theoretic assumptions (including strong RSA or bilinear maps); our claimable construction is a black-box transformation from any standard ring signature scheme to a claimable one; and our unclaimable construction is derived from the lattice-based ring signatures of [BK10], which rely on hardness of SIS. Our repudiable construction also provides a new construction of standard ring signatures.
Static-Memory-Hard Functions, and Modeling the Cost of Space vs. Time
A series of recent research starting with (Alwen and Serbinenko, STOC 2015) has deepened our understanding of the notion of memory-hardness in cryptography—a useful property of hash functions for deterring large-scale password-cracking attacks—and has shown memory-hardness to have intricate connections with the theory of graph pebbling. Definitions of memory-hardness are not yet unified in the somewhat nascent field of memory-hardness, however, and the guarantees proven to date are with respect to a range of proposed definitions. In this paper, we observe two significant and practical considerations that are not analyzed by existing models of memory-hardness, and propose new models to capture them, accompanied by constructions based on new hard-to-pebble graphs. Our contribution is two-fold, as follows. First, existing measures of memory-hardness only account for dynamic memory usage (i.e., memory read/written at runtime), and do not consider static memory usage (e.g., memory on disk). Among other things, this means that memory requirements considered by prior models are inherently upper-bounded by a hash function’s runtime; in contrast, counting static memory would potentially allow quantification of much larger memory requirements, decoupled from runtime. We propose a new definition of static-memory-hard function (SHF) which takes static memory into account: we model static memory usage by oracle access to a large preprocessed string, which may be considered part of the hash function description. Static memory requirements are complementary to dynamic memory requirements: neither can replace the other, and to deter large-scale password-cracking attacks, a hash function will benefit from being both dynamic-memory-hard and static-memory-hard. We give two SHF constructions based on pebbling. To prove static-memory-hardness, we define a new pebble game (“black-magic pebble game”), and new graph constructions with optimal complexity under our proposed measure. Moreover, we provide a prototype implementation of our first SHF construction (which is based on pebbling of a simple “cylinder” graph), providing an initial demonstration of practical feasibility for a limited range of parameter settings. Secondly, existing memory-hardness models implicitly assume that the cost of space and time are more or less on par: they consider only linear ratios between the costs of time and space. We propose a new model to capture nonlinear time-space trade-offs: e.g., how is the adversary impacted when space is quadratically more expensive than time? We prove that nonlinear tradeoffs can in fact cause adversaries to employ different strategies from linear tradeoffs.Please refer to the full version of our paper for all results, proofs, appendices, and implementation details [DLP18].

Program Committees

TCC 2020