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Key-Recovery Attacks on Full Kravatte ★
This paper presents a cryptanalysis of full Kravatte, an instantiation of the Farfalle construction of a pseudorandom function (PRF) with variable input and output length. This new construction, proposed by Bertoni et al., introduces an efficiently parallelizable and extremely versatile building block for the design of symmetric mechanisms, e.g. message authentication codes or stream ciphers. It relies on a set of permutations and on so-called rolling functions: it can be split into a compression layer followed by a two-step expansion layer. The key is expanded and used to mask the inputs and outputs of the construction. Kravatte instantiates Farfalle using linear rolling functions and permutations obtained by iterating the Keccak round function.We develop in this paper several attacks against this PRF, based on three different attack strategies that bypass part of the construction and target a reduced number of permutation rounds. A higher order differential distinguisher exploits the possibility to build an affine space of values in the cipher state after the compression layer. An algebraic meet-in-the-middle attack can be mounted on the second step of the expansion layer. Finally, due to the linearity of the rolling function and the low algebraic degree of the Keccak round function, a linear recurrence distinguisher can be found on intermediate states of the second step of the expansion layer. All the attacks rely on the ability to invert a small number of the final rounds of the construction. In particular, the last two rounds of the construction together with the final masking by the key can be algebraically inverted, which allows to recover the key.The complexities of the devised attacks, applied to the Kravatte specifications published on the IACR ePrint in July 2017, or the strengthened version of Kravatte recently presented at ECC 2017, are far below the security claimed.
State-Recovery Attacks on Modified Ketje Jr
In this article we study the security of the authenticated encryption algorithm Ketje against divide-and-conquer attacks. Ketje is a third-round candidate in the ongoing CAESAR competition, which shares most of its design principles with the SHA-3 hash function. Several versions of Ketje have been submitted, with different sizes for its internal state. We describe several state-recovery attacks on the smaller variant, called Ketje Jr. We show that if one increases the amount of keystream output after each round from 16 bits to 40 bits, Ketje Jr becomes vulnerable to divide-and-conquer attacks with time complexities 271.5 for the original version and 282.3 for the current tweaked version, both with a key of 96 bits. We also propose a similar attack when considering rates of 32 bits for the non-tweaked version. Our findings do not threaten the security of Ketje, but should be taken as a warning against potential future modifications that would aim at increasing the performance of the algorithm.
Cryptanalysis of NORX v2.0
NORX is an authenticated encryption scheme with associated data being publicly scrutinized as part of the ongoing CAESAR competition, where 14 other primitives are also competing. It is based on the sponge construction and relies on a simple permutation that allows efficient and versatile implementations. Thanks to research on the security of the sponge construction, the design of NORX, whose permutation is inspired from the permutations used in BLAKE and ChaCha, has evolved throughout three main versions (v1.0, v2.0 and v3.0). In this paper, we investigate the security of the full NORX v2.0 primitive that has been accepted as third-round candidate in the CAESAR competition. We show that some non-conservative design decisions probably motivated by implementation efficiency considerations result in at least one strong structural distinguisher of the underlying sponge permutation that can be turned into an attack on the full primitive. This attack yields a ciphertext-only forgery with time and data complexity 266 (resp. 2130) for the variant of NORX v2.0 using 128-bit (resp. 256-bit) keys and breaks the designers’ claim of a 128-bit, resp. 256-bit security. Furthermore, we show that this forgery attack can be extended to a key-recovery attack on the full NORX v2.0 with the same time and data complexities. We have implemented and experimentally verified the correctness of the attacks on a toy version of NORX. We emphasize that the scheme has recently been tweaked to NORX v3.0 at the beginning of the third round of the CAESAR competition: the main change introduces some key-dependent internal operations, which make NORX v3.0 immune to our attacks. However, the structural distinguisher of the permutation persists.
Cryptanalysis of RadioGatun
In this paper we study the security of the RadioGatun family of hash functions, and more precisely the collision resistance of this proposal. We show that it is possible to find differential paths with acceptable probability of success. Then, by using the freedom degrees available from the incoming message words, we provide a significant improvement over the best previously known cryptanalysis. As a proof of concept, we provide a colliding pair of messages for RadioGatun with 2-bit words. We finally argue that, under some light assumption, our technique is very likely to provide the first collision attack on RadioGatun.