## CryptoDB

### Michael Naehrig

#### Publications

**Year**

**Venue**

**Title**

2023

ASIACRYPT

Cryptographic Smooth Neighbors
Abstract

We revisit the problem of finding two consecutive $B$-smooth integers by giving an optimised implementation of the Conrey-Holm\-strom-McLaughlin ``smooth neighbors'' algorithm. While this algorithm is not guaranteed to return the complete set of $B$-smooth neighbors, in practice it returns a very close approximation to the complete set but does so in a tiny fraction of the time of its exhaustive counterparts. We exploit this algorithm to find record-sized solutions to the pure twin smooth problem, and subsequently to produce instances of cryptographic parameters whose corresponding isogeny degrees are significantly smoother than prior works. Our methods seem well-suited to finding parameters for the SQISign signature scheme, especially for instantiations looking to minimize the cost of signature generation. We give a number of examples, among which are the first parameter sets geared towards efficient SQISign instantiations at NIST's security levels III and V.

2021

EUROCRYPT

Sieving for twin smooth integers with solutions to the Prouhet-Tarry-Escott problem
📺
Abstract

We give a sieving algorithm for finding pairs of consecutive smooth numbers that utilizes solutions to the Prouhet-Tarry-Escott (PTE) problem. Any such solution induces two degree-n polynomials, a(x) and b(x), that differ by a constant integer C and completely split into linear factors in Z[x]. It follows that for any l in Z such that a(l) = b(l) = 0 mod C , the two integers a(l)/C and b(l)/C differ by 1 and necessarily contain n factors of roughly the same size. For a fixed smoothness bound B, restricting the search to pairs of integers that are parameterized in this way increases the probability that they are B-smooth. Our algorithm combines a simple sieve with parametrizations given by a collection of solutions to the PTE problem.
The motivation for finding large twin smooth integers lies in their application to compact isogeny-based post-quantum protocols. The recent key exchange scheme B-SIDH and the recent digital signature scheme SQISign both require large primes that lie between two smooth integers; finding such a prime can be seen as a special case of finding twin smooth integers under the additional stipulation that their sum is a prime p.
When searching for cryptographic parameters with 2^240 <= p < 2^256, an implementation of our sieve found primes p where p+1 and p-1 are 2^15-smooth; the smoothest prior parameters had a similar sized prime for which p-1 and p+1 were 2^19-smooth. In targeting higher security levels, our sieve found a 376-bit prime lying between two 2^21-smooth integers, a 384-bit prime lying between two 2^22-smooth integers, and a 512-bit prime lying between two 2^29-smooth integers. Our analysis shows that using previously known methods to find high-security instances subject to these smoothness bounds is computationally infeasible.

2020

EUROCRYPT

Implementing Grover oracles for quantum key search on AES and LowMC
📺
Abstract

Grover's search algorithm gives a quantum attack against block ciphers by searching for a key that matches a small number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs. This attack uses O(N) calls to the cipher to search a key space of size N. Previous work in the specific case of AES derived the full gate cost by analyzing quantum circuits for the cipher, but focused on minimizing the number of qubits.
In contrast, we study the cost of quantum key search attacks under a depth restriction and introduce techniques that reduce the oracle depth, even if it requires more qubits. As cases in point, we design quantum circuits for the block ciphers AES and LowMC. Our circuits give a lower overall attack cost in both the gate count and depth-times-width cost models. In NIST's post-quantum cryptography standardization process, security categories are defined based on the concrete cost of quantum key search against AES. We present new, lower cost estimates for each category, so our work has immediate implications for the security assessment of post-quantum cryptography.
As part of this work, we release Q# implementations of the full Grover oracle for AES-128, -192, -256 and for the three LowMC instantiations used in Picnic, including unit tests and code to reproduce our quantum resource estimates. To the best of our knowledge, these are the first two such full implementations and automatic resource estimations.

2020

PKC

Improved Classical Cryptanalysis of SIKE in Practice
📺
Abstract

The main contribution of this work is an optimized implementation of the van Oorschot-Wiener (vOW) parallel collision finding algorithm. As is typical for cryptanalysis against conjectured hard problems (e. g. factoring or discrete logarithms), challenges can arise in the implementation that are not captured in the theory, making the performance of the algorithm in practice a crucial element of estimating security. We present a number of novel improvements, both to generic instantiations of the vOW algorithm finding collisions in arbitrary functions, and to its instantiation in the context of the supersingular isogeny key encapsulation (SIKE) protocol, that culminate in an improved classical cryptanalysis of the computational supersingular isogeny (CSSI) problem. In particular, we present a scalable implementation that can be applied to the Round-2 parameter sets of SIKE that can be used to give confidence in their security levels.

2019

ASIACRYPT

Dual Isogenies and Their Application to Public-Key Compression for Isogeny-Based Cryptography
Abstract

The isogeny-based protocols SIDH and SIKE have received much attention for being post-quantum key agreement candidates that retain relatively small keys. A recent line of work has proposed and further improved compression of public keys, leading to the inclusion of public-key compression in the SIKE proposal for Round 2 of the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization effort. We show how to employ the dual isogeny to significantly increase performance of compression techniques, reducing their overhead from 160–182% to 77–86% for Alice’s key generation and from 98–104% to 59–61% for Bob’s across different SIDH parameter sets. For SIKE, we reduce the overhead of (1) key generation from 140–153% to 61–74%, (2) key encapsulation from 67–90% to 38–57%, and (3) decapsulation from 59–65% to 34–39%. This is mostly achieved by speeding up the pairing computations, which has until now been the main bottleneck, but we also improve (deterministic) basis generation.

#### Program Committees

- Eurocrypt 2023
- Eurocrypt 2021
- Asiacrypt 2021
- Crypto 2019
- PKC 2015

#### Coauthors

- Giacomo Bruno (1)
- Maria Corte-Real Santos (1)
- Craig Costello (6)
- Jonathan Komada Eriksen (1)
- David Jao (1)
- Samuel Jaques (1)
- Tanja Lange (1)
- Kristin E. Lauter (1)
- Patrick Longa (3)
- Adrián Macías (1)
- Michael Meyer (2)
- Thomas Pöppelmann (1)
- Andrew Putnam (1)
- Joost Renes (3)
- Martin Roetteler (2)
- Bruno Sterner (1)
- Krysta M. Svore (1)
- David Urbanik (1)
- Fernando Virdia (2)