International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Ed Dawson

Affiliation: Queensland University of Technology

Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2015
EPRINT
2010
EPRINT
Bias in the nonlinear filter generator output sequence
Nonlinear filter generators are common components used in the keystream generators for stream ciphers and more recently for authentication mechanisms. They consist of a Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) and a nonlinear Boolean function to mask the linearity of the LFSR output. Properties of the output of a nonlinear filter are not well studied. Anderson noted that the $m$-tuple output of a nonlinear filter with consecutive taps to the filter function is unevenly distributed. Current designs use taps which are not consecutive. We examine $m$-tuple outputs from nonlinear filter generators constructed using various LFSRs and Boolean functions for both consecutive and uneven (full positive difference sets where possible) tap positions. The investigation reveals that in both cases, the $m$-tuple output is not uniform. However, consecutive tap positions result in a more biased distribution than uneven tap positions, with some m-tuples not occurring at all. These biased distributions indicate a potential flaw that could be exploited for cryptanalysis.
2008
FSE
2008
ASIACRYPT
2007
EPRINT
Faster Group Operations on Special Elliptic Curves
This paper is on efficient implementation techniques of Elliptic Curve Cryptography. We improve group operation timings for Hessian and Jacobi-intersection forms of elliptic curves. In this study, traditional coordinates of these forms are modified to speed up the addition operations. For the completeness of our study, we also recall the modified Jacobi-quartic coordinates which benefits from similar optimizations. The operation counts on the modified coordinates of these forms are as follows: - Modified Hessian: Doubling 3M+6S, readdition 6M+6S, mixed addition 5M+6S, addition 6M+6S. - Modified Jacobi-intersection: Doubling 2M+5S+1D, readdition 11M+ 1S+2D, mixed addition 10M+1S+2D, addition 11M+1S+2D. - Modified Jacobi-quartic: Doubling 3M+4S, readdition 8M+3S+1D, mixed addition 7M+3S+1D, addition 8M+3S+1D. We compare various elliptic curve representations with respect to their performance evaluations for different point multiplication algorithms. We note that Jacobi-quartics can provide the fastest timings for some S/M and D/M values in fast point multiplication implementations. We also show that Hessian form can provide the fastest timings for some S/M and D/M values when side-channel resistance is required for point multiplication. (M: Field multiplication, S: Field squaring, D: Multiplication by a curve constant.)
2006
EPRINT
The classic Merkle-Damg{\aa}rd (\textbf{MD}) structure provides a popular way of turning a fixed-length compression function into a variable-length input cryptographic hash function. However, the multi-block collision attacks (MBCA) on the \textbf{MD}-style hash functions MD5, SHA-0 and SHA-1 demonstrate the weakness of the \textbf{MD} construction in extending the collision resistance property of a single compression function to its iterations. In this paper, we investigate a recently proposed cryptographic construction (called \textbf{3C}) devised by enhancing the \textbf{MD} construction, and prove it provides quantitatively more resistance against MBCA than does the \textbf{MD}-style. Specifically, we prove that it requires at least $2^{t/2}$ computational effort to perform any MBCA on the $t$-bit \textbf{3C} hash function when the same attack on a $t$-bit \textbf{MD} hash function (using the same compression function) requires an effort not less than $2^{t/4}$. This is the first result showing a generic construction with resistance to MBCA. We further improve the resistance of the \textbf{3C} design against MBCA and propose the new \textbf{3C+} hash function construction. We prove that \textbf{3C+} is completely \emph{immune} to MBCA since it costs at least $2^{t/2}$ effort to perform any MBCA on the \textbf{3C+} construction. This reduces the collision security of \textbf{3C+} to the collision security of the underlying compression function, hence restoring the paradigm that one only needs to design a secure compression function to obtain a secure iterated hash function. Both the \textbf{3C} and \textbf{3C+} constructions are very simple adjustments to the \textbf{MD} construction and they are immune to the straight forward extension attacks which apply to the \textbf{MD} hash functions. The second preimage attacks on $t$-bit hash functions also do not work on the constructions presented in this paper.
2005
CRYPTO
2005
EPRINT
LILI-II is not Broken
William Millan Ed Dawson
In this note we point out that a recently published attack on the LILI-II stream cipher does not do better than generic time-memory tradeoff techniques (which generalise exhaustive search and apply to any 128-bit key cipher). Thus we assert that LILI-II remains unbroken.
2005
EPRINT
Batch Verification of Validity of Bids in Homomorphic E-auction
Kun Peng Colin Boyd Ed Dawson
Bid opening in e-auction is efficient when a homomorphic secret sharing function is employed to seal the bids and homomorphic secret reconstruction is employed to open the bids. However, this high efficiency is based on an assumption: the bids are valid (e.g. within a special range). An undetected invalid bid can compromise correctness and fairness of the auction. Unfortunately, validity verification of the bids is ignored in the auction schemes employing homomorphic secret sharing (called homomorphic auction in this paper). In this paper, an attack against the homomorphic auction in the absence of bid validity check is presented and a necessary bid validity check mechanism is proposed. Then a batch cryptographic technique is introduced and applied to improve the efficiency of bid validity check.
2005
EPRINT
3C- A Provably Secure Pseudorandom Function and Message Authentication Code.A New mode of operation for Cryptographic Hash Function
We propose a new cryptographic construction called 3C, which works as a pseudorandom function (PRF), message authentication code (MAC) and cryptographic hash function. The 3C-construction is obtained by modifying the Merkle-Damgard iterated construction used to construct iterated hash functions. We assume that the compression functions of Merkle-Damgard iterated construction realize a family of fixed-length-input pseudorandom functions (FI-PRFs). A concrete security analysis for the family of 3C- variable-length-input pseudorandom functions (VI-PRFs) is provided in a precise and quantitative manner. The 3C- VI-PRF is then used to realize the 3C- MAC construction called one-key NMAC (O-NMAC). O-NMAC is a more efficient variant of NMAC and HMAC in the applications where key changes frequently and the key cannot be cached. The 3C-construction works as a new mode of hash function operation for the hash functions based on Merkle-Damgard construction such as MD5 and SHA-1. The generic 3C- hash function is more resistant against the recent differential multi-block collision attacks than the Merkle-Damgard hash functions and the extension attacks do not work on the 3C- hash function. The 3C-X hash function is the simplest and efficient variant of the generic 3C hash function and it is the simplest modification to the Merkle-Damgard hash function that one can achieve. We provide the security analysis for the functions 3C and 3C-X against multi-block collision attacks and generic attacks on hash functions. We combine the wide-pipe hash function with the 3C hash function for even better security against some generic attacks and differential attacks. The 3C-construction has all these features at the expense of one extra iteration of the compression function over the Merkle-Damgard construction.
2004
PKC
2000
FSE
2000
PKC
2000
JOFC
1998
EUROCRYPT
1996
FSE
1992
AUSCRYPT
1991
ASIACRYPT
1991
EUROCRYPT
1990
AUSCRYPT
1990
AUSCRYPT

Program Committees

Asiacrypt 2006
Asiacrypt 2002
PKC 2001
PKC 2000