International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Alexandra Boldyreva

Affiliation: Georgia Tech University

Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2017
CRYPTO
2015
EPRINT
2015
EPRINT
2015
EPRINT
2014
EPRINT
2014
FSE
2013
FSE
2012
EUROCRYPT
2012
JOFC
On-line Ciphers and the Hash-CBC Constructions
We initiate a study of on-line ciphers. These are ciphers that can take input plaintexts of large and varying lengths and will output the i th block of the ciphertext after having processed only the first i blocks of the plaintext. Such ciphers permit length-preserving encryption of a data stream with only a single pass through the data. We provide security definitions for this primitive and study its basic properties. We then provide attacks on some possible candidates, including CBC with fixed IV. We then provide two constructions, HCBC1 and HCBC2, based on a given block cipher E and a family of computationally AXU functions. HCBC1 is proven secure against chosen-plaintext attacks assuming that E is a PRP secure against chosen-plaintext attacks, while HCBC2 is proven secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks assuming that E is a PRP secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks.
2011
CRYPTO
2009
ASIACRYPT
2009
EUROCRYPT
2009
EPRINT
Foundations of Non-Malleable Hash and One-Way Functions
Non-malleability is an interesting and useful property which ensures that a cryptographic protocol preserves the independence of the underlying values: given for example an encryption Enc(m) of some unknown message m, it should be hard to transform this ciphertext into some encryption Enc(m*) of a related message m*. This notion has been studied extensively for primitives like encryption, commitments and zero-knowledge. Non-malleability of one-way functions and hash functions has surfaced as a crucial property in several recent results, but it has not undergone a comprehensive treatment so far. In this paper we initiate the study of such non-malleable functions. We start with the design of an appropriate security definition. We then show that non-malleability for hash and one-way functions can be achieved, via a theoretical construction that uses perfectly one-way hash functions and simulation-sound non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge (NIZKPoK). We also discuss the complexity of non-malleable hash and one-way functions. Specifically, we give a black-box based separation of non-malleable functions from one-way permutations (which our construction bypasses due to the 'non-black-box' NIZKPoK). We exemplify the usefulness of our definition in cryptographic applications by showing that non-malleability is necessary and sufficient to securely replace one of the two random oracles in the IND-CCA encryption scheme by Bellare and Rogaway, and to improve the security of client-server puzzles.
2008
CRYPTO
2008
EPRINT
On Notions of Security for Deterministic Encryption, and Efficient Constructions without Random Oracles
Alexandra Boldyreva Serge Fehr Adam O'Neill
The study of deterministic public-key encryption was initiated by Bellare et al. (CRYPTO~'07), who provided the ``strongest possible" notion of security for this primitive (called PRIV) and constructions in the random oracle (RO) model. We focus on constructing efficient deterministic encryption schemes \emph{without} random oracles. To do so, we propose a slightly weaker notion of security, saying that no partial information about encrypted messages should be leaked as long as each message is a-priori hard-to-guess \emph{given the others} (while PRIV did not have the latter restriction). Nevertheless, we argue that this version seems adequate for certain practical applications. We show equivalence of this definition to single-message and indistinguishability-based ones, which are easier to work with. Then we give general constructions of both chosen-plaintext (CPA) and chosen-ciphertext-attack (CCA) secure deterministic encryption schemes, as well as efficient instantiations of them under standard number-theoretic assumptions. Our constructions build on the recently-introduced framework of Peikert and Waters (STOC '08) for constructing CCA-secure \emph{probabilistic} encryption schemes, extending it to the deterministic-encryption setting and yielding some improvements to their original results as well.
2007
CRYPTO
2007
PKC
2007
EPRINT
On-Line Ciphers and the Hash-CBC Constructions
We initiate a study of on-line ciphers. These are ciphers that can take input plaintexts of large and varying lengths and will output the i-th block of the ciphertext after having processed only the first i blocks of the plaintext. Such ciphers permit length-preserving encryption of a data stream with only a single pass through the data. We provide security definitions for this primitive and study its basic properties. We then provide attacks on some possible candidates, including CBC with fixed IV. We then provide two constructions, HCBC1 and HCBC2, based on a given block cipher E and a family of computationally AXU functions. HCBC1 is proven secure against chosen-plaintext attacks assuming that E is a PRP secure against chosen-plaintext attacks, while HCBC2 is proven secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks assuming that E is a PRP secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks.
2007
EPRINT
Provable-Security Analysis of Authenticated Encryption in Kerberos
Alexandra Boldyreva Virendra Kumar
Kerberos is a widely-deployed network authentication protocol that is being considered for standardization. Many works have analyzed its security, identifying flaws and often suggesting fixes, thus helping the protocol's evolution. Several recent results present successful formal-methods-based verification of a significant portion of the current version 5, and some even imply security in the computational setting. For these results to hold, encryption in Kerberos should satisfy strong cryptographic security notions. However, neither currently deployed as part of Kerberos encryption schemes nor their proposed revisions are known to provably satisfy such notions. We take a close look at Kerberos' encryption and confirm that most of the options in the current version provably provide privacy and authenticity, some with slight modification that we suggest. Our results complement the formal-methods-based analysis of Kerberos that justifies its current design.
2007
EPRINT
Ordered Multisignatures and Identity-Based Sequential Aggregate Signatures, with Applications to Secure Routing
Alexandra Boldyreva Craig Gentry Adam O'Neill Dae Hyun Yum
We construct two new multiparty digital signature schemes that allow multiple signers to sequentially produce a compact, fixed-length signature. First, we introduce a new primitive that we call \emph{ordered multisignatures} (OMS), which allows signers to attest to a common message as well as the order in which they signed. Our OMS construction substantially improves computational efficiency and scalability over any existing scheme with suitable functionality. Second, we design a new identity-based sequential aggregate signature scheme, where signers can attest to different messages and signature verification does not require knowledge of traditional public keys. The latter property permits savings on bandwidth and storage as compared to public-key solutions. In contrast to the only prior scheme to provide this functionality, ours offers improved security that does not rely on synchronized clocks or a trusted first signer. We provide formal security definitions and support the proposed schemes with security proofs under appropriate computational assumptions. We focus on potential applications of our schemes to secure network routing, but we believe they will find many other applications as well.
2006
ASIACRYPT
2006
EPRINT
Deterministic and Efficiently Searchable Encryption
Mihir Bellare Alexandra Boldyreva Adam O'Neill
We present as-strong-as-possible definitions of privacy, and constructions achieving them, for public-key encryption schemes where the encryption algorithm is \textit{deterministic}. We obtain as a consequence database encryption methods that permit fast (i.e.~sub-linear, and in fact logarithmic, time) search while provably providing privacy that is as strong as possible subject to this fast search constraint. One of our constructs, called RSA-DOAEP, has the added feature of being length preserving, so that it is the first example of a public-key cipher. We generalize this to obtain a notion of efficiently-searchable encryption schemes which permit more flexible privacy to search-time trade-offs via a technique called bucketization. Our results answer much-asked questions in the database community and provide foundations for work done there.
2005
CRYPTO
2004
EUROCRYPT
2003
PKC
2003
PKC
2003
EPRINT
An Uninstantiable Random-Oracle-Model Scheme for a Hybrid Encryption Problem
Mihir Bellare Alexandra Boldyreva Adriana Palacio
We present a simple, natural random-oracle (RO) model scheme, for a practical goal, that is uninstantiable, meaning is proven in the RO model to meet its goal yet admits NO standard-model instantiation that meets this goal. The goal in question is IND-CCA-preserving asymmetric encryption which formally captures security of the most common practical usage of asymmetric encryption, namely to transport a symmetric key in such a way that symmetric encryption under the latter remains secure. The scheme is an ElGamal variant, called Hash ElGamal, that resembles numerous existing RO-model schemes, and on the surface shows no evidence of its anomalous properties. More generally, we show that a certain goal, that we call key-verifiable, ciphertext-verifiable IND-CCA-preserving asymmetric encryption, is achievable in the RO model (by Hash ElGamal in particular) but unachievable in the standard model. This helps us better understand the source of the anomalies in Hash ElGamal and also lifts our uninstantiability result from being about a specific scheme to being about a primitive or goal. These results extend our understanding of the gap between the standard and RO models, and bring concerns raised by previous work closer to practice by indicating that the problem of RO-model schemes admitting no secure instantiation can arise in domains where RO schemes are commonly designed.
2003
EPRINT
Secure Proxy Signature Schemes for Delegation of Signing Rights
Alexandra Boldyreva Adriana Palacio Bogdan Warinschi
A proxy signature scheme permits an entity to delegate its signing rights to another entity. These schemes have been suggested for use in numerous applications, particularly in distributed computing. But to date, no proxy signature schemes with guaranteed security have been proposed; no precise definitions or proofs of security have been provided for such schemes. In this paper, we formalize a notion of security for proxy signature schemes and present provably-secure schemes. We analyze the security of the well-known delegation-by-certificate scheme and show that after some slight but important modifications, the resulting scheme is secure, assuming the underlying standard signature scheme is secure. We then show that employment of the recently introduced aggregate signature schemes permits bandwidth and computational savings. Finally, we analyze the proxy signature scheme of Kim, Park and Won, which offers important performance benefits. We propose modifications to this scheme that preserve its efficiency, and yield a proxy signature scheme that is provably secure in the random-oracle model, under the discrete-logarithm assumption.
2002
EPRINT
Efficient threshold signature, multisignature and blind signature schemes based on the Gap-Diffie-Hellman-group signature scheme
Alexandra Boldyreva
We propose a robust proactive threshold signature scheme, a multisignature scheme and a blind signature scheme which work in any Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) group (where the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem is hard but the Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem is easy). Our constructions are based on the recently proposed GDH signature scheme of Boneh et al. \cite{bls}. Due to the instrumental structure of GDH groups and of the base scheme, it turns out that most of our constructions are simpler, more efficient and have more useful properties than similar existing constructions. We support all the proposed schemes with proofs under the appropriate computational assumptions, using the corresponding notions of security.
2001
ASIACRYPT
2001
CRYPTO
2000
ASIACRYPT
2000
EUROCRYPT
2000
EPRINT
The Security of Chaffing and Winnowing
Mihir Bellare Alexandra Boldyreva
This paper takes a closer look at Rivest's chaffing-and-winnowing paradigm for data privacy. We begin with a \textit{definition} which enables one to determine clearly whether a given scheme qualifies as ``chaffing-and-winnowing.'' We then analyze Rivest's schemes to see what quality of data privacy they provide. His simplest scheme is easily proven secure but is ineffient. The security of his more efficient scheme ---based on all-or-nothing transforms (AONTs)--- is however more problematic. It can be attacked under Rivest's definition of security of an AONT, and even under stronger notions does not appear provable. We show however that by using a OAEP as the AONT one can prove security. We also present a different scheme, still using AONTs, that is equally efficient and easily proven secure even under the original weak notion of security of AONTs.

Program Committees

Crypto 2019
Crypto 2018
Eurocrypt 2017
Eurocrypt 2015
PKC 2014
TCC 2014
PKC 2012
TCC 2012
PKC 2011
PKC 2010
TCC 2010
Eurocrypt 2009
Eurocrypt 2008
PKC 2008
Asiacrypt 2007
Eurocrypt 2006
Crypto 2005