International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Andrew Chi-Chih Yao

Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2016
JOFC
2012
JOFC
Graph Coloring Applied to Secure Computation in Non-Abelian Groups
We study the natural problem of secure n-party computation (in the computationally unbounded attack model) of circuits over an arbitrary finite non-Abelian group (G,⋅), which we call G-circuits. Besides its intrinsic interest, this problem is also motivating by a completeness result of Barrington, stating that such protocols can be applied for general secure computation of arbitrary functions. For flexibility, we are interested in protocols which only require black-box access to the group G (i.e. the only computations performed by players in the protocol are a group operation, a group inverse, or sampling a uniformly random group element). Our investigations focus on the passive adversarial model, where up to t of the n participating parties are corrupted.Our results are as follows. We initiate a novel approach for the construction of black-box protocols for G-circuits based on k-of-k threshold secret-sharing schemes, which are efficiently implementable over any black-box (non-Abelian) group G. We reduce the problem of constructing such protocols to a combinatorial coloring problem in planar graphs. We then give three constructions for such colorings. Our first approach leads to a protocol with optimal resilience t<n/2, but it requires exponential communication complexity $O({\binom{2 t+1}{t}}^{2} \cdot N_{g})$ group elements and round complexity $O(\binom{2 t + 1}{t} \cdot N_{g})$, for a G-circuit of size Ng. Nonetheless, using this coloring recursively, we obtain another protocol to t-privately compute G-circuits with communication complexity $\mathcal{P}\mathit{oly}(n)\cdot N_{g}$ for any t∈O(n1−ϵ) where ϵ is any positive constant. For our third protocol, there is a probability δ (which can be made arbitrarily small) for the coloring to be flawed in term of security, in contrast to the first two techniques, where the colorings are always secure (we call this protocol probabilistic, and those earlier protocols deterministic). This third protocol achieves optimal resilience t<n/2. It has communication complexity O(n5.056(n+log δ−1)2⋅Ng) and the number of rounds is O(n2.528⋅(n+log δ−1)⋅Ng).
2008
ASIACRYPT
2008
ASIACRYPT
2007
EPRINT
Deniable Internet Key-Exchange
In this work, we develop a family of protocols for deniable Internet Key-Exchange (IKE) with the following properties: 1. item Highly practical efficiency, and conceptual simplicity and clarity. 2. Forward and concurrent (non-malleable) deniability against adversaries with arbitrary auxiliary inputs, and better privacy protection of players' roles. 3. Provable security in the Canetti-Krawczyk post-specified-peer model, and maintenance of essential security properties not captured by the Canetti-Krawczyk security model. 4. Compatibility with the widely deployed and standardized SIGMA (i.e., the basis of IKEv2) and (H)MQV protocols, when parties possess DL public-keys. Our protocols could potentially serve, in part, as either the underlying basis or a useful alternative for the next generation of IKE (i.e., IKEv3) of IPsec (in particular, when deniability is desired). In view of the wide deployment and use of IKE and increasing awareness of privacy protection (especially for E-commerce over Internet), this work is naturally of practical interest.
2002
CRYPTO
1982
CRYPTO

Program Committees

Crypto 2010