International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Yao-Ching Hsieh

Publications and invited talks

Year
Venue
Title
2025
EUROCRYPT
A Generic Approach to Adaptively-Secure Broadcast Encryption in the Plain Model
Yao-Ching Hsieh Brent Waters David J. Wu
Broadcast encryption allows a user to encrypt a message to N recipients with a ciphertext whose size scales sublinearly with N. The natural security notion for broadcast encryption is adaptive security which allows an adversary to choose the set of recipients after seeing the public parameters. Achieving adaptive security in broadcast encryption is challenging, and in the plain model, the primary technique is the celebrated dual-systems approach, which can be implemented over groups with bilinear maps. Unfortunately, it has been challenging to replicate the dual-systems approach in other settings (e.g., with lattices or witness encryption). Moreover, even if we focus on pairing-based constructions, the dual-systems framework relies critically on decisional (and source-group) assumptions. We do not have constructions of adaptively-secure broadcast encryption from search (or target-group) assumptions assumptions in the plain model. Gentry and Waters (EUROCRYPT 2009) described a compiler that takes any semi-statically-secure broadcast encryption scheme and transforms it into an adaptively-secure scheme in the random oracle model. While semi-static security is easier to achieve and constructions are known from witness encryption as well as search (and target-group) assumptions on pairing groups, the transformed scheme relies on random oracles. In this work, we show that using publicly-sampleable projective PRGs, we can achieve adaptive security in the plain model. We then show how to build publicly-sampleable projective PRGs from many standard number-theoretic assumptions (e.g., CDH, LWE, RSA). Our compiler yields the first adaptively-secure broadcast encryption schemes from search assumptions as well as the first adaptively-secure scheme from witness encryption (which can in turn be based on evasive LWE) in the plain model. We also obtain the first adaptively-secure pairing-based scheme with linear-size public keys and constant-size ciphertexts. Previous adaptively-secure pairing-based schemes with constant-size ciphertexts had quadratic-size public keys.
2025
CRYPTO
Registered ABE and Adaptively-Secure Broadcast Encryption from Succinct LWE
Jeffrey Champion Yao-Ching Hsieh David J. Wu
Registered attribute-based encryption (ABE) is a generalization of public-key encryption that enables fine-grained access control to encrypted data (like standard ABE), but without needing a central trusted authority. In a key-policy registered ABE scheme, users choose their own public and private keys and then register their public keys together with a decryption policy with an (untrusted) key curator. The key curator aggregates all of the individual public keys into a short master public key which serves as the public key for an ABE scheme. Currently, we can build registered ABE for restricted policies (e.g., Boolean formulas) from pairing-based assumptions and for general policies using witness encryption or indistinguishability obfuscation. In this work, we construct a key-policy registered ABE for general policies (specifically, bounded-depth Boolean circuits) from the \ell-succinct learning with errors (LWE) assumption in the random oracle model. The ciphertext size in our registered ABE scheme is poly(\lambda, d), where \lambda is a security parameter and d is the depth of the circuit that computes the policy circuit C. Notably, this is independent of the length of the attribute x and is optimal up to the poly(d) factor. Previously, the only lattice-based instantiation of registered ABE uses witness encryption, which relies on private-coin evasive LWE, a stronger assumption than \ell-succinct LWE. Moreover, the ciphertext size in previous registered ABE schemes that support general policies (i.e., from obfuscation or witness encryption) scales with poly(\lambda, |x|, |C|). The ciphertext size in our scheme depends only on the depth of the circuit (and not the length of the attribute or the size of the policy). This enables new applications to identity-based distributed broadcast encryption. Our techniques are also useful for constructing adaptively-secure (distributed) broadcast encryption, and we give the first scheme from the \ell-succinct LWE assumption in the random oracle model. Previously, the only lattice-based broadcast encryption scheme with adaptive security relied on witness encryption in the random oracle model. All other lattice-based broadcast encryption schemes only achieved selective security.
2025
CRYPTO
Lattice-Based Post-Quantum iO from Circular Security with Random Opening Assumption
Yao-Ching Hsieh Aayush Jain Huijia Lin
Indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) stands out as a powerful cryptographic primitive but remains notoriously difficult to realize under simple-to-state, post-quantum assumptions. Recent works have proposed lattice-inspired iO constructions backed by new “LWE-with-hints” assumptions, which posit that certain distributions of LWE samples retain security despite auxiliary information. However, subsequent cryptanalysis has revealed structural vulnerabilities in these assumptions, leaving us without any post-quantum iO candidates supported by simple, unbroken assumptions. Motivated by these proposals, we introduce the \emph{Circular Security with Random Opening} (CRO) assumption—a new LWE-with-hint assumption that addresses structural weaknesses from prior assumptions, and based on our systematic examination, does not appear vulnerable to known cryptanalytic techniques. In CRO, the hints are random ``openings'' of zero-encryptions under the Gentry--Sahai--Waters (GSW) homomorphic encryption scheme. Crucially, these zero-encryptions are efficiently derived from the original LWE samples via a special, carefully designed procedure, ensuring that the openings are marginally random. Moreover, the openings do not induce any natural leakage on the LWE noises. These two features---{\em marginally random hints and the absence of (natural) noise leakage}---rule out important classes of attacks that had undermined all previous LWE-with-hint assumptions for iO. Therefore, our new lattice-based assumption for iO provides a qualitatively different target for cryptanalysis compared to existing assumptions. To build iO under this less-structured CRO assumption, we develop several new technical ideas. In particular, we devise an \emph{oblivious LWE sampling} procedure, which succinctly encodes random LWE secrets and smudging noises, and uses a tailored-made homomorphic evaluation procedure to generate secure LWE samples. Crucially, all non-LWE components in this sampler, including the secrets and noises of the generated samples, are independently and randomly distributed, avoiding attacks on non-LWE components.
2024
EUROCRYPT
A General Framework for Lattice-Based ABE Using Evasive Inner-Product Functional Encryption
Yao-Ching Hsieh Huijia Lin Ji Luo
We present a general framework for constructing attribute-based encryption (ABE) schemes for arbitrary function class based on lattices from two ingredients, i) a noisy linear secret sharing scheme for the class and ii) a new type of inner-product functional encryption (IPFE) scheme, termed *evasive* IPFE, which we introduce in this work. We propose lattice-based evasive IPFE schemes and establish their security under simple conditions based on variants of evasive learning with errors (LWE) assumption recently proposed by Wee [EUROCRYPT '22] and Tsabary [CRYPTO '22]. Our general framework is modular and conceptually simple, reducing the task of constructing ABE to that of constructing noisy linear secret sharing schemes, a more lightweight primitive. The versatility of our framework is demonstrated by three new ABE schemes based on variants of the evasive LWE assumption. - We obtain two ciphertext-policy ABE schemes for all polynomial-size circuits with a predetermined depth bound. One of these schemes has *succinct* ciphertexts and secret keys, of size polynomial in the depth bound, rather than the circuit size. This eliminates the need for tensor LWE, another new assumption, from the previous state-of-the-art construction by Wee [EUROCRYPT '22]. - We develop ciphertext-policy and key-policy ABE schemes for deterministic finite automata (DFA) and logspace Turing machines (L). They are the first lattice-based public-key ABE schemes supporting uniform models of computation. Previous lattice-based schemes for uniform computation were limited to the secret-key setting or offered only weaker security against bounded collusion. Lastly, the new primitive of evasive IPFE serves as the lattice-based counterpart of pairing-based IPFE, enabling the application of techniques developed in pairing-based ABE constructions to lattice-based constructions. We believe it is of independent interest and may find other applications.
2023
ASIACRYPT
On the (Im)possibility of Time-Lock Puzzles in the Quantum Random Oracle Model
Time-lock puzzles wrap a solution s inside a puzzle P in such a way that “solving” P to find s requires significantly more time than generating the pair (s, P), even if the adversary has access to parallel computing; hence it can be thought of as sending a message s to the future. It is known [Mahmoody, Moran, Vadhan, Crypto’11] that when the source of hardness is only a random oracle, then any puzzle generator with n queries can be (efficiently) broken by an adversary in O(n) rounds of queries to the oracle. In this work, we revisit time-lock puzzles in a quantum world by allowing the parties to use quantum computing and, in particular, access the random oracle in quantum superposition. An interesting setting is when the puzzle generator is efficient and classical, while the solver (who might be an entity developed in the future) is quantum-powered and is supposed to need a long sequential time to succeed. We prove that in this setting there is no construction of time-lock puzzles solely from quantum (accessible) random oracles. In particular, for any n-query classical puzzle generator, our attack only asks O(n) (also classical) queries to the random oracle, even though it does indeed run in quantum polynomial time if the honest puzzle solver needs quantum computing. Assuming perfect completeness, we also show how to make the above attack run in exactly n rounds while asking a total of m · n queries where m is the query complexity of the puzzle solver. This is indeed tight in the round complexity, as we also prove that a classical puzzle scheme of Mahmoody et al. is also secure against quantum solvers who ask n−1 rounds of queries. In fact, even for the fully classical case, our attack quantitatively improves the total queries of the attack of Mahmoody et al. for the case of perfect completeness from O(mn log n) to mn. Finally, assuming perfect completeness, we present an attack in the “dual” setting in which the puzzle generator is quantum while the solver is classical. We then ask whether one can extend our classical-query attack to the fully quantum setting, in which both the puzzle generator and the solver could be quantum. We show a barrier for proving such results unconditionally. In particular, we show that if the folklore simulation conjecture, first formally stated by Aaronson and Ambainis [arXiv’2009] is false, then there is indeed a time-lock puzzle in the quantum random oracle model that cannot be broken by classical adversaries. This result improves the previous barrier of Austrin et. al [Crypto’22] about key agreements (that can have interactions in both directions) to time-lock puzzles (that only include unidirectional communication).