International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research


Quang Dao


Spartan and Bulletproofs are simulation-extractable (for free!)
Quang Dao Paul Grubbs
Increasing deployment of advanced zero-knowledge proof systems, especially zkSNARKs, has raised critical questions about their security against real-world attacks. Two classes of attacks of concern in practice are adaptive soundness attacks, where an attacker can prove false statements by choosing its public input after generating a proof, and malleability attacks, where an attacker can use a valid proof to create another valid proof it could not have created itself. Prior work has shown that simulation-extractability (SIM-EXT), a strong notion of security for proof systems, rules out these attacks. In this paper, we prove that two transparent, discrete-log-based zkSNARKs, Spartan and Bulletproofs, are simulation-extractable (SIM-EXT) in the random oracle model if the discrete logarithm assumption holds in the underlying group. Since these assumptions are required to prove standard security properties for Spartan and Bulletproofs, our results show that SIM-EXT is, surprisingly, ``for free'' with these schemes. Our result is the first SIM-EXT proof for Spartan and encompasses both linear- and sublinear-verifier variants. Our result for Bulletproofs encompasses both the aggregate range proof and arithmetic circuit variants, and is the first to not rely on the algebraic group model (AGM), resolving an open question posed by Ganesh et al. (EUROCRYPT'22). As part of our analysis, we develop a generalization of the tree-builder extraction theorem of Attema et al. (TCC'22), which may be of independent interest.
Multi-Party Homomorphic Secret Sharing and Sublinear MPC from Sparse LPN
Over the past few years, we have seen the powerful emergence of homomorphic secret sharing (HSS) as a compelling alternative to fully homomorphic encryption (FHE), due to its efficiency benefits and its feasibility from an array of standard assumptions. However, all previously known HSS schemes, with the exception of schemes built from FHE or indistinguishability obfuscation (iO), can only support two parties. In this work, we give the first construction of a \emph{multi-party} HSS scheme for a non-trivial function class, from an assumption not known to imply FHE. In particular, we construct an HSS scheme for an \emph{arbitrary} number of parties with an \emph{arbitrary} corruption threshold, supporting evaluations of $\log / \log \log$-degree polynomials, containing a polynomial number of monomials, over arbitrary finite fields. As a consequence, we obtain an MPC protocol for any number of parties, with (slightly) \emph{sub-linear} communication per party of roughly $O(S / \log \log S)$ bits when evaluating a layered Boolean circuit of size $S$. Our HSS scheme relies on the \emph{sparse} Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) assumption, a standard variant of LPN with a sparse public matrix that has been studied and used in prior works. Thanks to this assumption, our construction enjoys several unique benefits. In particular, it can be built on top of \emph{any} linear secret sharing scheme, producing noisy output shares that can be error-corrected by the decoder. This yields HSS for low-degree polynomials with optimal download rate. Unlike prior works, our scheme also has a low computation overhead in that the per-party computation of a constant degree polynomial takes $O(M)$ work, where $M$ is the number of monomials.


Paul Grubbs (1)
Yuval Ishai (1)
Aayush Jain (1)
Huijia Lin (1)