International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research


Thomas Ricosset


Polytopes in the Fiat-Shamir with Aborts Paradigm
The Fiat-Shamir with Aborts paradigm (FSwA) uses rejection sampling to remove a secret’s dependency from a given source distribution. Recent results revealed that unlike the uniform distribution in the hypercube, both the continuous Gaussian and the uniform distribution within the hypersphere minimise the rejection rate and the size of the proof of knowledge. However, in practice both these distributions suffer from the complexity of their sampler. So far, those three distributions are the only available alternatives, but none of them offer the best of all worlds: competitive proof of knowledge size and rejection rate with a simple sampler. We introduce a new generic framework for FSwA using polytope based rejection sampling to enable a wider variety of constructions. As a matter of fact, this framework is the first to generalise these results to integral distributions. To complement the lack of alternatives, we also propose a new polytope construction, whose uniform sampler approaches in simplicity that of the hypercube. At the same time, it provides competitive proof of knowledge sizes compared to those obtained from the Gaussian distribution. Concurrently, we share some experimental improvements of our construction to further shorten the proof size. Finally, we propose a signature based on the FSwA paradigm using both our framework and construction. We prove it to be competitive with Haetae in signature size and with Dilithium on sampler simplicity.
The Hidden Parallelepiped Is Back Again: Power Analysis Attacks on Falcon
FALCON is a very efficient and compact lattice-based signature finalist of the NIST’s Post-Quantum standardization campaign. This work assesses Falcon’s sidechannel resistance by analyzing two vulnerabilities, namely the pre-image computation and the trapdoor sampling. The first attack is an improvement of Karabulut and Aysu (DAC 2021). It overcomes several difficulties inherent to the structure of the stored key like the Fourier representation and directly recovers the key with a limited number of traces and a reduced complexity. The main part of this paper is dedicated to our second attack: we show that a simple power analysis during the signature execution could provide the exact value of the output of a subroutine called the base sampler. This intermediate value does not directly lead to the secret and we had toadapt the so-called hidden parallelepiped attack initially introduced by Nguyen and Regev in Eurocrypt 2006 and reused by Ducas and Nguyen in Asiacrypt 2012. We extensively quantify the resources for our attacks and experimentally demonstrate them with FALCON’s reference implementation on the ELMO simulator (McCann, Oswald and Whitnall USENIX 2017) and on a ChipWhisperer Lite with STM32F3 target (ARM Cortex M4).These new attacks highlight the need for side-channel protection for one of the three finalists of NIST’s standardization campaign by pointing out the vulnerable parts and quantifying the resources of the attacks.