International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Johannes Blömer

Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2014
EPRINT
2014
EPRINT
2014
EPRINT
2007
EPRINT
Analysis of countermeasures against access driven cache attacks on AES
Johannes Blömer
Cache attacks on implementations of cryptographic algorithms have turned out to be very powerful. Progress in processor design, e.g., like hyperthreading, requires to adapt models for tampering or side-channel attacks to cover cache attacks as well. Hence, in this paper we present a rather general model for cache attacks. Our model is stronger than recently used ones. We introduce the notions of information leakage and so called resistance to analyze the security of several implementations of AES. Furthermore, we analyze how to use random permutations to protect against cache attacks. By providing a successful attack on an AES implementation protected by random permutations we show that random permutations used in a straightforward manner are not enough to protect against cache attacks. Hence, to improve upon the security provided by random permutations, we describe the property a permutation must have in order to prevent the leakage of some key bits through cache attacks. Using a permutation having this property forces an adversary to consider several rounds of the cipher. This increases the complexity of any cache attack considerably. We also describe how to implement our countermeasure efficiently. The method to do so is of independent interest, since it alone can also be used to protect against cache attacks. Moreover, combining both countermeasures allows for a trade-off between security and efficiency.
2005
EUROCRYPT
2004
PKC
2004
EPRINT
Provably Secure Masking of AES
A general method to secure cryptographic algorithm implementations against side-channel attacks is the use of randomization techniques and, in particular, masking. Roughly speaking, using random values unknown to an adversary one masks the input to a cryptographic algorithm. As a result, the intermediate results in the algorithm computation are uncorrelated to the input and the adversary cannot obtain any useful information from the side-channel. Unfortunately, previous AES randomization techniques have based their security on heuristics and experiments. Thus, flaws have been found which make AES randomized implementations still vulnerable to side-channel cryptanalysis. In this paper, we provide a formal notion of security for randomized maskings of arbitrary cryptographic algorithms. Furthermore, we present an AES randomization technique that is provably secure against side-channel attacks if the adversary is able to access a single intermediate result. Our randomized masking technique is quite general and it can be applied to arbitrary algorithms using only arithmetic operations over some even characteristic finite field. We notice that to our knowledge this is the first time that a randomization technique for the AES has been proven secure in a formal model.
2004
EPRINT
Sign Change Fault Attacks On Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems
Johannes Blömer Martin Otto Jean-Pierre Seifert
We present a new type of fault attacks on elliptic curve scalar multiplications: Sign Change Attacks. These attacks exploit different number representations as they are often employed in modern cryptographic applications. Previously, fault attacks on elliptic curves aimed to force a device to output points which are on a cryptographically weak curve. Such attacks can easily be defended against. Our attack produces points which do not leave the curve and are not easily detected. The paper also presents a revised scalar multiplication algorithm that provably protects against Sign Change Attacks.
2003
CRYPTO
2002
EPRINT
Fault based cryptanalysis of the Advanced Encryption Standard
Johannes Blömer J.-P.\ Seifert
In this paper we describe several fault attacks on the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). First, using optical fault induction attacks as recently publicly presented by Skorobogatov and Anderson \cite{SA}, we present an implementation independent fault attack on AES. This attack is able to determine the complete $128$-bit secret key of a sealed tamper-proof smartcard by generating $128$ faulty cipher texts. Second, we present several implementation-dependent fault attacks on AES. These attacks rely on the observation that due to the AES's known timing analysis vulnerability (as pointed out by Koeune and Quisquater \cite{KQ}), any implementation of the AES must ensure a data independent timing behavior for the so called AES's {\tt xtime} operation. We present fault attacks on AES based on various timing analysis resistant implementations of the {\tt xtime}-operation. Our strongest attack in this direction uses a very liberal fault model and requires only $256$ faulty encryptions to determine a $128$-bit key.