International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Axel Poschmann

Affiliation: DarkMatter LLC

Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2014
EPRINT
2014
CHES
2011
CRYPTO
2011
EUROCRYPT
2011
CHES
2011
JOFC
2010
EPRINT
Parallelizing the Camellia and SMS4 Block Ciphers - Extended version
Huihui Yap Khoongming Khoo Axel Poschmann
The n-cell GF-NLFSR (Generalized Feistel-NonLinear Feedback Shift Register) structure [8] is a generalized unbalanced Feistel network that can be considered as a generalization of the outer function FO of the KASUMI block cipher. An advantage of this cipher over other n-cell generalized Feistel networks, e.g. SMS4 [11] and Camellia [5], is that it is parallelizable for up to n rounds. In hardware implementations, the benefits translate to speeding up encryption by up to n times while consuming similar area and significantly less power. At the same time n-cell GF-NLFSR structures offer similar proofs of security against differential cryptanalysis as conventional n-cell Feistel structures. We also ensure that parallelized versions of Camellia and SMS4 are resistant against other block cipher attacks such as linear, boomerang, integral, impossible differential, higher order differential,interpolation, slide, XSL and related-key differential attacks.
2010
CHES
2010
CHES
2008
EPRINT
Information Leakage of Flip-Flops in DPA-Resistant Logic Styles
This contribution discusses the information leakage of flip-flops for different DPA-resistant logic styles. We show that many of the proposed side-channel resistant logic styles still employ flip-flops that leak data-dependent information. Furthermore, we apply simple models for the leakage of masked flip-flops to design a new attack on circuits implemented using masked logic styles. Contrary to previous attacks on masked logic styles, our attack does not predict the mask bit and does not need detailed knowledge about the attacked device, e.g., the circuit layout. Moreover, our attack works even if all the load capacitances of the complementary logic signals are perfectly balanced and even if the PRNG is ideally unbiased. Finally, after performing the attack on DRSL, MDPL, and iMDPL circuits we show that single-bit masks do not influence the exploitability of the revealed leakage of the masked flip-flops.
2008
CHES
2007
CHES
2007
FSE

Program Committees

CHES 2019
CHES 2018
CHES 2016
Crypto 2015
CHES 2015
CHES 2014
CHES 2012
CHES 2010