## CryptoDB

### Ido Shahaf

#### Publications

**Year**

**Venue**

**Title**

2020

EUROCRYPT

Generic-Group Delay Functions Require Hidden-Order Groups
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Abstract

Despite the fundamental importance of delay functions, underlying both the classic notion of a time-lock puzzle and the more recent notion of a verifiable delay function, the only known delay function that offers both sufficient structure for realizing these two notions and a realistic level of practicality is the ``iterated squaring'' construction of Rivest, Shamir and Wagner. This construction, however, is based on rather strong assumptions in groups of hidden orders, such as the RSA group (which requires a trusted setup) or the class group of an imaginary quadratic number field (which is still somewhat insufficiently explored from the cryptographic perspective). For more than two decades, the challenge of constructing delay functions in groups of known orders, admitting a variety of well-studied instantiations, has eluded the cryptography community.
In this work we prove that there are no constructions of generic-group delay functions in cyclic groups of known orders: We show that for any delay function that does not exploit any particular property of the representation of the underlying group, there exists an attacker that completely breaks the function's sequentiality when given the group's order. As any time-lock puzzle and verifiable delay function give rise to a delay function, our result holds for these two notions we well, and explains the lack of success in resolving the above-mentioned long-standing challenge. Moreover, our result holds even if the underlying group is equipped with a d-linear map, for any constant d>=2 (and even for super-constant values of d under certain conditions).

2018

CRYPTO

Tight Tradeoffs in Searchable Symmetric Encryption
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Abstract

A searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) scheme enables a client to store data on an untrusted server while supporting keyword searches in a secure manner. Recent experiments have indicated that the practical relevance of such schemes heavily relies on the tradeoff between their space overhead, locality (the number of non-contiguous memory locations that the server accesses with each query), and read efficiency (the ratio between the number of bits the server reads with each query and the actual size of the answer). These experiments motivated Cash and Tessaro (EUROCRYPT ’14) and Asharov et al. (STOC ’16) to construct SSE schemes offering various such tradeoffs, and to prove lower bounds for natural SSE frameworks. Unfortunately, the best-possible tradeoff has not been identified, and there are substantial gaps between the existing schemes and lower bounds, indicating that a better understanding of SSE is needed.We establish tight bounds on the tradeoff between the space overhead, locality and read efficiency of SSE schemes within two general frameworks that capture the memory access pattern underlying all existing schemes. First, we introduce the “pad-and-split” framework, refining that of Cash and Tessaro while still capturing the same existing schemes. Within our framework we significantly strengthen their lower bound, proving that any scheme with locality L must use space $$\varOmega ( N \log N / \log L )$$Ω(NlogN/logL) for databases of size N. This is a tight lower bound, matching the tradeoff provided by the scheme of Demertzis and Papamanthou (SIGMOD ’17) which is captured by our pad-and-split framework.Then, within the “statistical-independence” framework of Asharov et al. we show that their lower bound is essentially tight: We construct a scheme whose tradeoff matches their lower bound within an additive $$O(\log \log \log N)$$O(logloglogN) factor in its read efficiency, once again improving upon the existing schemes. Our scheme offers optimal space and locality, and nearly-optimal read efficiency that depends on the frequency of the queried keywords: For a keyword that is associated with $$n = N^{1 - \epsilon (n)}$$n=N1-ϵ(n) document identifiers, the read efficiency is $$\omega (1) \cdot {\epsilon }(n)^{-1}+ O(\log \log \log N)$$ω(1)·ϵ(n)-1+O(logloglogN) when retrieving its identifiers (where the $$\omega (1)$$ω(1) term may be arbitrarily small, and $$\omega (1) \cdot {\epsilon }(n)^{-1}$$ω(1)·ϵ(n)-1 is the lower bound proved by Asharov et al.). In particular, for any keyword that is associated with at most $$N^{1 - 1/o(\log \log \log N)}$$N1-1/o(logloglogN) document identifiers (i.e., for any keyword that is not exceptionally common), we provide read efficiency $$O(\log \log \log N)$$O(logloglogN) when retrieving its identifiers.

2018

TCC

Ciphertext Expansion in Limited-Leakage Order-Preserving Encryption: A Tight Computational Lower Bound
Abstract

Order-preserving encryption emerged as a key ingredient underlying the security of practical database management systems. Boldyreva et al. (EUROCRYPT ’09) initiated the study of its security by introducing two natural notions of security. They proved that their first notion, a “best-possible” relaxation of semantic security allowing ciphertexts to reveal the ordering of their corresponding plaintexts, is not realizable. Later on Boldyreva et al. (CRYPTO ’11) proved that any scheme satisfying their second notion, indistinguishability from a random order-preserving function, leaks about half of the bits of a random plaintext.This unsettling state of affairs was recently changed by Chenette et al. (FSE ’16), who relaxed the above “best-possible” notion and constructed a scheme satisfying it based on any pseudorandom function. In addition to revealing the ordering of any two encrypted plaintexts, ciphertexts in their scheme reveal only the position of the most significant bit on which the plaintexts differ. A significant drawback of their scheme, however, is its substantial ciphertext expansion: Encrypting plaintexts of length m bits results in ciphertexts of length $$m \cdot \ell $$ bits, where $$\ell $$ determines the level of security (e.g., $$\ell = 80$$ in practice).In this work we prove a lower bound on the ciphertext expansion of any order-preserving encryption scheme satisfying the “limited-leakage” notion of Chenette et al. with respect to non-uniform polynomial-time adversaries, matching the ciphertext expansion of their scheme up to lower-order terms. This improves a recent result of Cash and Zhang (TCC ’18), who proved such a lower bound for schemes satisfying this notion with respect to computationally-unbounded adversaries (capturing, for example, schemes whose security can be proved in the random-oracle model without relying on cryptographic assumptions). Our lower bound applies, in particular, to schemes whose security is proved in the standard model.

#### Coauthors

- Gilad Asharov (1)
- Ilya Mironov (1)
- Alon Rosen (1)
- Lior Rotem (1)
- Gil Segev (5)