CryptoDB
Cache Timing Leakages in Zero-Knowledge Protocols
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| Download: | |
| Presentation: | Slides |
| Abstract: | The area of modern zero-knowledge proof systems has seen a significant rise in popularity over the last couple of years, with new techniques and optimized constructions emerging on a regular basis. As the field matures, the aspect of implementation attacks becomes more relevant, however side-channel attacks on zero-knowledge proof systems have seen surprisingly little treatment so far. In this paper we give an overview of potential attack vectors and show that some of the underlying finite field libraries, and implementations of heavily used components like hash functions, are vulnerable w.r.t. cache attacks on CPUs. On the positive side, we demonstrate that the computational overhead to protect against these attacks is relatively small. |
| Video: | https://youtu.be/wqugrcrXaRw |
BibTeX
@misc{rwc-2025-35878,
title={Cache Timing Leakages in Zero-Knowledge Protocols},
note={Video at \url{https://youtu.be/wqugrcrXaRw}},
howpublished={Talk given at RWC 2025},
author={Shibam Mukherjee and Christian Rechberger and Markus Schofnegger},
year=2025
}