CryptoDB
Lattice-based Obfuscation from NTRU and Equivocal LWE
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| Conference: | CRYPTO 2025 |
| Abstract: | Indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) turns a program unintelligible without altering its functionality and is a powerful cryptographic primitive that captures the power of most known primitives. Recent breakthroughs have successfully constructed iO from well-founded computational assumptions, yet these constructions are unfortunately insecure against quantum adversaries. In the search of post-quantum secure iO, a line of research investigates constructions from fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) and tailored decryption hint release mechanisms. Proposals in this line mainly differ in their designs of decryption hints, yet all known attempts either cannot be proven from a self-contained computational assumption, or are based on novel lattice assumptions which are subsequently cryptanalysed. In this work, we propose a new plausibly post-quantum secure construction of iO by designing a new mechanism for releasing decryption hints. Unlike prior attempts, our decryption hints follow a public Gaussian distribution subject to decryption correctness constraints and are therefore in a sense as random as they could be. To generate such hints efficiently, we develop a general-purpose tool called primal lattice trapdoors, which allow sampling trapdoored matrices whose Learning with Errors (LWE) secret can be equivocated. We prove the security of our primal lattice trapdoors construction from the NTRU assumption. The security of the iO construction is then argued, along with other standard lattice assumptions, via a new Equivocal LWE assumption, for which we provide evidence for plausibility and identify potential targets for further cryptanalysis. |
BibTeX
@inproceedings{crypto-2025-35741,
title={Lattice-based Obfuscation from NTRU and Equivocal LWE},
publisher={Springer-Verlag},
author={Valerio Cini and Russell W. F. Lai and Ivy K. Y. Woo},
year=2025
}