International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research


Weakening Assumptions for Publicly-Verifiable Deletion

James Bartusek , UC Berkeley
Dakshita Khurana , UIUC
Giulio Malavolta , Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy
Alexander Poremba , Caltech
Michael Walter , Ruhr-Universitat Bochum
Search ePrint
Search Google
Presentation: Slides
Conference: TCC 2023
Abstract: We develop a simple compiler that generically adds publicly-verifiable deletion to a variety of cryptosystems. Our compiler only makes use of one-way functions (or one-way state generators, if we allow the public verification key to be quantum). Previously, similar compilers either relied on indistinguishability obfuscation along with any one-way function (Bartusek et. al., ePrint:2023/265), or on almost-regular one-way functions (Bartusek, Khurana and Poremba, CRYPTO 2023).
  title={Weakening Assumptions for Publicly-Verifiable Deletion},
  author={James Bartusek and Dakshita Khurana and Giulio Malavolta and Alexander Poremba and Michael Walter},