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Paper: An Algebraic Attack on Ciphers with Low-Degree Round Functions: Application to Full MiMC

Authors: Maria Eichlseder Lorenzo Grassi Reinhard Lüftenegger Morten Øygarden Christian Rechberger Markus Schofnegger Qingju Wang DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-64837-4_16 Search ePrint Search Google Slides Algebraically simple PRFs, ciphers, or cryptographic hash functions are becoming increasingly popular, for example due to their attractive properties for MPC and new proof systems (SNARKs, STARKs, among many others). In this paper, we focus on the algebraically simple construction MiMC, which became an attractive cryptanalytic target due to its simplicity, but also due to its use as a baseline in a competition for more recent algorithms exploring this design space. For the first time, we are able to describe key-recovery attacks on all full-round versions of MiMC over GF(2^n), requiring half the code book. In the chosen-ciphertext scenario, recovering the key from this data for the n-bit full version of MiMC takes the equivalent of less than 2^(n - log_2(n) + 1) calls to MiMC and negligible amounts of memory. The attack procedure is a generalization of higher-order differential cryptanalysis, and it is based on two main ingredients. First, we present a higher-order distinguisher which exploits the fact that the algebraic degree of MiMC grows significantly slower than originally believed. Secondly, we describe an approach to turn this distinguisher into a key-recovery attack without guessing the full subkey. Finally, we show that approximately ceil(log_3(2 * R)) more rounds (where R = ceil(n * log_3(2)) is the current number of rounds of MiMC-n/n) can be necessary and sufficient to restore the security against the key-recovery attack presented here. The attack has been practically verified on toy versions of MiMC. Note that our attack does not affect the security of MiMC over prime fields.
BibTeX
@article{asiacrypt-2020-30683,
title={An Algebraic Attack on Ciphers with Low-Degree Round Functions: Application to Full MiMC},
booktitle={Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT 2020},
publisher={Springer},
doi={10.1007/978-3-030-64837-4_16},
author={Maria Eichlseder and Lorenzo Grassi and Reinhard Lüftenegger and Morten Øygarden and Christian Rechberger and Markus Schofnegger and Qingju Wang},
year=2020
}