CryptoDB
Christophe Clavier
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Publications
Year
Venue
Title
2017
CHES
Improved Blind Side-Channel Analysis by Exploitation of Joint Distributions of Leakages
Abstract
Classical side-channel analysis include statistical attacks which require the knowledge of either the plaintext or the ciphertext to predict some internal value to be correlated to the observed leakages.In this paper we revisit a blind (i.e. leakage-only) attack from Linge et al. that exploits joint distributions of leakages. We show – both by simulations and concrete experiments on a real device – that the maximum likelihood (ML) approach is more efficient than Linge’s distance-based comparison of distributions, and demonstrate that this method can be easily adapted to deal with implementations protected by first-order Boolean masking. We give example applications of different variants of this approach, and propose countermeasures that could prevent them.Interestingly, we also observe that, when the inputs are known, the ML criterion is more efficient than correlation power analysis.
Program Committees
- CHES 2020
- CHES 2018
- CHES 2017
- CHES 2014
- CHES 2013
- CHES 2010
- CHES 2009 (Program chair)
- CHES 2008
- CHES 2007
Coauthors
- Eric Brier (3)
- Benoît Chevallier-Mames (1)
- Mathieu Ciet (1)
- Christophe Clavier (11)
- Jean-Sébastien Coron (3)
- Nora Dabbous (1)
- Benoit Feix (2)
- Georges Gagnerot (1)
- Marc Joye (1)
- Damien Marion (1)
- David Naccache (1)
- Francis Olivier (1)
- Pascal Paillier (1)
- Léo Reynaud (1)
- Mylène Roussellet (1)
- Loïc Thierry (1)
- Vincent Verneuil (1)
- Antoine Wurcker (1)