International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Ian Goldberg

Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2015
EPRINT
2010
ASIACRYPT
2008
EPRINT
Pairing-Based Onion Routing with Improved Forward Secrecy
This paper presents new protocols for onion routing anonymity networks. We define a provably secure privacy-preserving key agreement scheme in an identity-based infrastructure setting, and use it to forge new onion routing circuit constructions. These constructions, based on a user's selection, offer immediate or eventual forward secrecy at each node in a circuit and require significantly less computation and communication than the telescoping mechanism used by Tor. Further, the use of the identity-based infrastructure also leads to a reduction in the required amount of authenticated directory information. Therefore, our constructions provide practical ways to allow onion routing anonymity networks to scale gracefully.
2008
EPRINT
Sphinx: A Compact and Provably Secure Mix Format
George Danezis Ian Goldberg
Sphinx is a cryptographic message format used to relay anonymized messages within a mix network. It is more compact than any comparable scheme, and supports a full set of security features: indistinguishable replies, hiding the path length and relay position, as well as providing unlinkability for each leg of the message's journey over the network. We prove the full cryptographic security of Sphinx in the random oracle model, and we describe how it can be used as an efficient drop-in replacement in deployed remailer systems.
2001
EPRINT
A Description of Protocols for Private Credentials
This document provides a short description of practical protocols for private credential systems. We explain the basic concepts and mechanisms behind issuing and showing of private credentials and e-cash. The goal is to describe concisely how practical private credential systems can be achieved and not to provide intuition or motivation for the technology; for information on these subjects, see [1,2,3]. We give the details of one specific type of practical protocols for private credentials; other choices of functionalities and optimizations are possible. The reader is assumed to have general knowledge of basic concepts of cryptography such as the Discrete Logarithm problem, basic group theory and hash functions. For security proofs and more elaborate descriptions of the techniques used we refer the reader to [2].
2000
ASIACRYPT