## CryptoDB

### Je Hong Park

#### Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2009
EPRINT
In this paper, we introduce a new notion of security, called adaptive preimage resistance. We prove that a compression function that is collision resistant and adaptive preimage resistant can be combined with a public random function to yield a hash function that is indifferentiable from a random oracle. Specifically, we analyze adaptive preimage resistance of 2n-bit to n-bit compression functions that use three calls to n-bit public random permutations. By using such compression functions as building blocks, we obtain a method for construction of permutation-based pseudorandom oracles that is comparable to the Sponge construction [4] both in terms of security and efficiency.
2008
EPRINT
In this paper, we present a new authenticated key exchange(AKE) protocol and prove its security under the random oracle assumption and the computational Diffie-Hellman(CDH) assumption. In the extended Canetti-Krawczyk model, there has been no known AKE protocol based on the CDH assumption. Our protocol, called NAXOS+, is obtained by slightly modifying the NAXOS protocol proposed by LaMacchia, Lauter and Mityagin. We establish a formal security proof of NAXOS+ in the extended Canetti-Krawczyk model using as a main tool the trapdoor test presented by Cash, Kiltz and Shoup.
2007
ASIACRYPT
2007
EPRINT
In this paper, we revisit the variant of the self-shrinking generator(SSG) proposed by Chang et al. at ICISC 2006. This variant, which we call SSG-XOR was claimed to have better cryptographic properties than SSG in a practical setting. But we show that SSG-XOR has no advantage over SSG from the viewpoint of practical cryptanalysis.
2007
EPRINT
We introduce the notion of quasi-Feistel network, which is generalization of the Feistel network, and contains the Lai-Massey scheme as an instance. We show that some of the works on the Feistel network, including the works of Luby-Rackoff, Patarin, Naor-Reingold and Piret, can be naturally extended to our setting. This gives a new proof for theorems of Vaudenay on the security of the Lai-Massey scheme, and also introduces for Lai-Massey a new construction of pseudorandom permutation, analoguous to the construction of Naor-Reingold using pairwise independent permutations. Also, we prove the birthday security of $(2b-1)$- and $(3b-2)$-round unbalanced quasi-Feistel networks with b branches against CPA and CPCA attacks, respectively. This answers an unsolved problem pointed out by Patarin et al.
2006
EPRINT
In this paper, we will show that the certificateless signature scheme recently proposed by Yap, Heng and Goi at EUC Workshops 2006 is insecure against a key replacement attack. Our attack shows that anyone who replaces a signer's public key can forge valid signatures for that signer without knowledge of the signer's private key.
2005
EPRINT
In this paper, we investigate the relationship between the squared Weil/Tate pairing and the plain Weil/Tate pairing. Along these lines, we first show that the squared pairing for arbitrary chosen point can be transformed into a plain pairing for the trace zero point which has a special form to compute them more efficiently. This transformation requires only a cost of some Frobenius actions. Additionally, we show that the squared Weil pairing can be computed more efficiently for trace zero point and derive an explicit formula for the 4th powered Weil pairing as an optimized version of the Weil pairing.
2005
EPRINT
Pairing computation requires a lot of efforts for portable small devices such as smart cards. It was first considered concretely by Chevallier-Mames et al. that the cards delegate computation of pairings to a powerful device. In this paper, we propose more efficient protocols than those of Chevallier-Mames et al. in two cases, and provide two new variants that would be useful in real applications.
2005
EPRINT
In this paper, we introduce a powered Tate pairing on a supersingular elliptic curve that has the same shortened loop as the modified Tate pairing using the eta pairing approach by Barreto et al. The main significance of our approach is to remove the condition which the latter should rely on. It implies that our method is simpler and potentially general than the eta pairing approach, although they are equivalent in most practical cases.
2005
EPRINT
Recently, Al-Riyami and Paterson proposed a generic conversion from CL-PKE (Certificateless Public Key Encryption) to CBE (Certificate Based Encryption) and claimed that the derived CBE scheme is secure and even more efficient than the original scheme of Gentry. In this paper, we show that their conversion is wrong due to the flaw of the security proof. It leads the new concrete CBE scheme by Al-Riyami and Paterson to be invalidated. In addition, our result supports the impossibility to relate both notions in any directions.
2004
EPRINT
In this paper, we present two forward secure signature schemes based on gap Diffie-Hellman groups and prove these schemes to be secure in the sense of slightly stronger security notion than that by Bellare and Miner in the random oracle model. Both schemes use the same key update strategy as the encryption scheme presented by Canetti, Halevi and Katz. Hence, our schemes outperform the previous tree-based forward secure signature scheme by Bellare and Miner in the key generation and key update time, which are only constant in the number of time periods. Specifically, we describe a straightforward scheme following from the encryption scheme, and then improve its efficiency for signature verification algorithm which needs only 3 pairing computations independent of the total time periods.
2003
EUROCRYPT

#### Coauthors

Sang Geun Hahn (1)
Jaewoo Han (1)
Shoichi Hirose (1)
Bo Gyeong Kang (5)
Eonkyung Lee (1)
Jooyoung Lee (3)
Dong Hoon Lee (1)
Moon Sung Lee (1)
Aaram Yun (2)