International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Rishiraj Bhattacharyya

Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2021
EUROCRYPT
Compactness of Hashing Modes and Efficiency beyond Merkle Tree
Elena Andreeva Rishiraj Bhattacharyya Arnab Roy
We revisit the classical problem of designing optimally efficient cryptographically secure hash functions. Hash functions are traditionally designed via applying modes of operation on primitives with smaller domains. The results of Shrimpton and Stam (ICALP 2008), Rogaway and Steinberger (CRYPTO 2008), and Mennink and Preneel (CRYPTO 2012) show how to achieve optimally efficient designs of $2n$-to-$n$-bit compression functions from non-compressing primitives with asymptotically optimal $2^{n/2-\epsilon}$-query collision resistance. Designing optimally efficient and secure hash functions for larger domains ($> 2n$ bits) is still an open problem. To enable efficiency analysis and comparison across hash functions built from primitives of different domain sizes, in this work we propose the new \textit{compactness} efficiency notion. It allows us to focus on asymptotically optimally collision resistant hash function and normalize their parameters based on Stam's bound from CRYPTO 2008 to obtain maximal efficiency. We then present two tree-based modes of operation as a design principle for compact, large domain, fixed-input-length hash functions. \begin{enumerate} \item Our first construction is an \underline{A}ugmented \underline{B}inary T\underline{r}ee (\cmt) mode. The design is a $(2^{\ell}+2^{\ell-1} -1)n$-to-$n$-bit hash function making a total of $(2^{\ell}-1)$ calls to $2n$-to-$n$-bit compression functions for any $\ell\geq 2$. Our construction is optimally compact with asymptotically (optimal) $2^{n/2-\epsilon}$-query collision resistance in the ideal model. For a tree of height $\ell$, in comparison with Merkle tree, the $\cmt$ mode processes additional $(2^{\ell-1}-1)$ data blocks making the same number of internal compression function calls. \item With our second design we focus our attention on the indifferentiability security notion. While the $\cmt$ mode achieves collision resistance, it fails to achieve indifferentiability from a random oracle within $2^{n/3}$ queries. $\cmt^{+}$ compresses only $1$ less data block than $\cmt$ with the same number of compression calls and achieves in addition indifferentiability up to $2^{n/2-\epsilon}$ queries. \end{enumerate} Both of our designs are closely related to the ubiquitous Merkle Trees and have the potential for real-world applicability where the speed of hashing is of primary interest.
2020
PKC
Memory-Tight Reductions for Practical Key Encapsulation Mechanisms 📺
Rishiraj Bhattacharyya
The efficiency of a black-box reduction is an important goal of modern cryptography. Traditionally, the time complexity and the success probability were considered as the main aspects of efficiency measurements. In CRYPTO 2017, Auerbach et al. introduced the notion of memory-tightness in cryptographic reductions and showed a memory-tight reduction of the existential unforgeability of the RSA-FDH signature scheme. Unfortunately, their techniques do not extend directly to the reductions involving intricate RO-programming. The problem seems to be inherent as all the other existing results on memory-tightness are lower bounds and impossibility results. In fact, Auerbach et al. conjectured that a memory-tight reduction for security of Hashed-ElGamal KEM is impossible. We refute the above conjecture. Using a simple RO simulation technique, we provide memory-tight reductions of security of the Cramer-Shoup and the ECIES version of Hashed-ElGamal KEM. We prove memory-tight reductions for different variants of Fujisaki-Okamoto Transformation. We analyze the modular transformations introduced by Hofheinz, Hövermanns and Kiltz (TCC 2017). In addition to the constructions involving implicit rejection, we present a memory-tight reduction for the security of the transformation $$mathsf{ ext {QFO}_m^perp }$$ . Our techniques can withstand correctness-errors, and applicable to several lattice-based KEM candidates.
2013
FSE
2011
PKC
2010
FSE