International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Igor E. Shparlinski

Affiliation: University of New South Wales

Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2015
EPRINT
2006
JOFC
2005
EPRINT
Elliptic Curves with Low Embedding Degree
Florian Luca Igor E. Shparlinski
Motivated by the needs of the {\it pairing based cryptography\/}, Miyaji, Nakabayashi and Takano have suggested a construction of so-called MNT elliptic curves with low embedding degree. We give some heuristic arguments which suggest that there are only about $z^{1/2+o(1)}$ of MNT curves with complex multiplication discriminant up to $z$. We also show that there are very few finite fields over which elliptic curves with small embedding degree and small complex multiplication discriminant may exist (regardless of the way they are constructed).
2004
PKC
2004
PKC
2003
PKC
2003
EPRINT
Hidden Number Problem in Small Subgroups
Igor E. Shparlinski Arne Winterhof
Boneh and Venkatesan have proposed a polynomial time algorithm for recovering a "hidden" element $\alpha \in \F_p$, where $p$ is prime, from rather short strings of the most significant bits of the residue of $\alpha t$ modulo $p$ for several randomly chosen $t\in \F_p$. Gonz{\'a}lez Vasco and the first author have recently extended this result to subgroups of $\F_p^*$ of order at least $p^{1/3+\varepsilon}$ for all $p$ and to subgroups of order at least $p^\varepsilon$ for almost all $p$. Here we introduce a new modification in the scheme which amplifies the uniformity of distribution of the `multipliers' $t$ and thus extend this result to subgroups of order at least $(\log p)/(\log \log p)^{1-\varepsilon}$ for all primes $p$. As in the above works, we give applications of our result to the bit security of the Diffie--Hellman secret key starting with subgroups of very small size, thus including all cryptographically interesting subgroups.
2002
CRYPTO
2002
PKC
2002
EPRINT
Secure Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Bits
The Weil and Tate pairings are a popular new gadget in cryptography and have found many applications, including identity-based cryptography. In particular, the pairings have been used for key exchange protocols. This paper studies the bit security of keys obtained using protocols based on pairings (that is, we show that obtaining certain bits of the common key is as hard as computing the entire key). These results are valuable as they give insight into how many ``hard-core'' bits can be obtained from key exchange using pairings.
2002
JOFC
2001
ASIACRYPT
2001
CRYPTO
2001
PKC
2000
PKC
2000
EPRINT
On the Security of Diffie--Hellman Bits
Maria Isabel Gonzalez Vasco Igor E. Shparlinski
Boneh and Venkatesan have recently proposed a polynomial time algorithm for recovering a "hidden" element $\alpha$ of a finite field $\F_p$ of $p$ elements from rather short strings of the most significant bits of the remainder modulo $p$ of $\alpha t$ for several values of $t$ selected uniformly at random from $\F_p^*$. We use some recent bounds of exponential sums to generalize this algorithm to the case when $t$ is selected from a quite small subgroup of $\F_p^*$. Namely, our results apply to subgroups of size at least $p^{1/3+ \varepsilon}$ for all primes $p$ and to subgroups of size at least $p^{\varepsilon}$ for almost all primes $p$, for any fixed $\varepsilon >0$. We also use this generalization to improve (and correct) one of the statements of the aforementioned work about the computational security of the most significant bits of the Diffie--Hellman key.
2000
EPRINT
Security of Polynomial Transformations of the Diffie--Hellman Key
Igor E. Shparlinski
D. Boneh and R. Venkatesan have recently proposed an approachto proving that a reasonably small portions of most significant bits of the Diffie-Hellman key modulo a prime are as secure the the whole key. Some further improvements and generalizations have been obtained by I. M. Gonzales Vasco and I. E. Shparlinski. E. R. Verheul has obtained certain analogies of these results in the case of Diffie--Hellman keys in extensions of finite fields, when an oracle is given to compute a certain polynomial function of the key, for example, the trace in the background field. Here we obtain some new results in this direction concerning the case of so-called "unreliable" oracles.
2000
EPRINT
Security of the Most Significant Bits of the Shamir Message Passing Scheme
Maria Isabel Gonzalez Vasco Igor E. Shparlinski
Boneh and Venkatesan have recently proposed a polynomial time algorithm for recovering a ``hidden'' element $\alpha$ of a finite field $\F_p$ of $p$ elements from rather short strings of the most significant bits of the remainder mo\-du\-lo $p$ of $\alpha t$ for several values of $t$ selected uniformly at random from $\F_p^*$. Unfortunately the applications to the computational security of most significant bits of private keys of some finite field exponentiation based cryptosystems given by Boneh and Venkatesan are not quite correct. For the Diffie-Hellman cryptosystem the result of Boneh and Venkatesan has been corrected and generalized in our recent paper. Here a similar analysis is given for the Shamir message passing scheme. The results depend on some bounds of exponential sums.
2000
JOFC

Program Committees

Eurocrypt 2012
PKC 2012
Crypto 2009
PKC 2009
PKC 2007
Eurocrypt 2005
Eurocrypt 2004
PKC 2002