## CryptoDB

#### Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2008
EPRINT
We present an efficient, covert-channel-resistant, receipt-free ballot casting scheme that can be used by humans without trusted hardware. In comparison to the recent Moran-Naor proposal, our scheme produces a significantly shorter ballot, prevents covert channels in the ballot, and opts for statistical soundness rather than everlasting privacy (achieving both seems impossible). The human interface remains the same, based on Neff's MarkPledge scheme, and requires of the voter only short-string operations.
2007
TCC
2007
EPRINT
We introduce an offline precomputation technique for mix-nets that drastically reduces the amount of online computation needed. Our method can be based on any additively homomorphic cryptosystem and is applicable when the number of senders and the maximal bit-size of messages are relatively small.
2005
EPRINT
We show how to public-key obfuscate two commonly used shuffles: decryption shuffles which permute and decrypt ciphertexts, and re-encryption shuffles which permute and re-encrypt ciphertexts. Given a trusted party that samples and obfuscates a shuffle \emph{before} any ciphertexts are received, this reduces the problem of constructing a mix-net to verifiable joint decryption. We construct a decryption shuffle from any additively homomorphic cryptosystem and show how it can be public-key obfuscated. This construction does not allow efficient distributed verifiable decryption. Then we show how to public-key obfuscate: a decryption shuffle based on the Boneh-Goh-Nissim (BGN) cryptosystem, and a re-encryption shuffle based on the Paillier cryptosystem. Both constructions allow \emph{efficient} distributed verifiable decryption. In the Paillier case we identify and exploit a previously overlooked homomorphic'' property of the cryptosystem. Finally, we give a distributed protocol for sampling and obfuscating each of the above shuffles and show how it can be used in a trivial way to construct a universally composable mix-net. Our constructions are practical when the number of senders $N$ is reasonably small, e.g. $N=350$ in the BGN case and $N=2000$ in the Paillier case.

#### Coauthors

C. Andrew Neff (1)
Douglas Wikström (3)