International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Nick Howgrave-Graham

Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2010
EPRINT
New generic algorithms for hard knapsacks
Nick Howgrave-Graham Antoine Joux
In this paper, we study the complexity of solving hard knapsack problems, i.e., knapsacks with a density close to $1$ where lattice-based low density attacks are not an option. For such knapsacks, the current state-of-the-art is a 31-year old algorithm by Schroeppel and Shamir which is based on birthday paradox techniques and yields a running time of $\TildeOh(2^{n/2})$ for knapsacks of $n$ elements and uses $\TildeOh(2^{n/4})$ storage. We propose here two new algorithms which improve on this bound, finally lowering the running time down to $\TildeOh (2^{0.3113\, n})$ for almost all knapsacks of density $1$. We also demonstrate the practicality of these algorithms with an implementation.
2010
EUROCRYPT
2008
EPRINT
IEEE P1363.1 Draft 10: Draft Standard for Public Key Cryptographic Techniques Based on Hard Problems over Lattices
Engineering specifications and security considerations for NTRUEncrypt, secure against the lattice attacks presented at Crypto 2007
2007
CRYPTO
2007
EPRINT
Isodual Reduction of Lattices
Nicholas A. Howgrave-Graham
We define a new notion of a reduced lattice, based on a quantity introduced in the LLL paper. We show that lattices reduced in this sense are simultaneously reduced in both their primal and dual. We show that the definition applies naturally to blocks, and therefore gives a new hierarchy of polynomial time algorithms for lattice reduction with fixed blocksize. We compare this hierarchy of algorithms to previous ones. We then explore algorithms to provably minimize the associated measure, and also some more efficient heuristics. Finally we comment on the initial investigations of applying our technique to the NTRU family of lattices.
2006
CRYPTO
2006
EUROCRYPT
2005
EPRINT
Choosing Parameter Sets for NTRUEncrypt with NAEP and SVES-3
Nick Howgrave-Graham Joseph H. Silverman William Whyte
We present, for the first time, an algorithm to choose parameter sets for NTRUEncrypt that give a desired level of security. Note: This is an expanded version of a paper presented at CT-RSA 2005.
2005
EPRINT
On estimating the lattice security of NTRU
This report explicitly refutes the analysis behind a recent claim that NTRUEncrypt has a bit security of at most 74 bits. We also sum up some existing literature on NTRU and lattices, in order to help explain what should and what should not be classed as an improved attack against the hard problem underlying NTRUEncrypt. We also show a connection between Schnorr's RSR technique and exhaustively searching the NTRU lattice.
2005
EPRINT
Performance Improvements and a Baseline Parameter Generation Algorithm for NTRUSign
The original presentation of the NTRUSign signature scheme gave a set of parameters that were claimed to give 80 bits of security, but did not give a general recipe for generating parameter sets to a specific level of security. In line with recent research on NTRUEncrypt, this paper presents an outline of such a recipe for NTRUSign. We also present certain technical advances upon which we intend to build in subsequent papers.
2004
EPRINT
Divisors in Residue Classes, Constructively
Don Coppersmith Nick Howgrave-Graham S. V. Nagaraj
Let $r,s,n$ be integers satisfying $0 \leq r < s < n$, $s \geq n^{\alpha}$, $\alpha > 1/4$, and $\gcd(r,s)=1$. Lenstra showed that the number of integer divisors of $n$ equivalent to $r \pmod s$ is upper bounded by $O((\alpha-1/4)^{-2})$. We re-examine this problem; showing how to explicitly construct all such divisors and incidentally improve this bound to $O((\alpha-1/4)^{-3/2})$.
2004
EPRINT
Modified Parameter Attacks: Practical Attacks against CCA2 Secure Cryptosystems and Countermeasures
We introduce the concept of Modified Parameter Attacks, a natural extension of the idea of Adapative Chosen Ciphertext Attacks (CCA2) under which some CCA2 secure systems can be shown to be insecure. These insecurities can be addressed at the application level, but can also be addressed when cryptographic schemes are being designed. We survey some existing CCA2 secure systems which are vulnerable to this attack and suggest practical countermeasures.
2003
ASIACRYPT
2003
CRYPTO
2003
EPRINT
NAEP: Provable Security in the Presence of Decryption Failures
We consider the impact of the possibility of decryption failures in proofs of security for padding schemes, where these failures are both message and key dependent. We explain that an average case failure analysis is not necessarily sufficient to achieve provable security with existing CCA2-secure schemes. On a positive note, we introduce NAEP, an efficient padding scheme similar to PSS-E designed especially for the NTRU one-way function. We show that with this padding scheme we can prove security in the presence of decryption failures, under certain explicitly stated assumptions. We also discuss the applicability of proofs of security to instantiated cryptosystems in general, introducing a more practical notion of cost to describe the power of an adversary.
2002
JOFC
2001
ASIACRYPT
2001
CHES
2001
EUROCRYPT
1999
CRYPTO

Program Committees

Eurocrypt 2009
Crypto 2007
PKC 2006