Affiliation: UC San Diego
Analysis of the SPV Secure Routing Protocol: Weaknesses and Lessons
We analyze a secure routing protocol, Secure Path Vector (SPV), proposed in SIGCOMM 2004. SPV aims to provide authenticity for route announcements in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) using an efficient alternative to ordinary digital signatures, called constant-time signatures. Today, SPV is often considered the best cryptographic defense for BGP. We find subtle flaws in the design of SPV which lead to attacks that can be mounted by 60% of Autonomous Systems in the Internet. In addition, we study several of SPV's design decisions and assumptions and highlight the requirements for security of routing protocols. In light of our analysis, we reexamine the need for constant-time signatures and find that certain standard digital signature schemes can provide the same level of efficiency for route authenticity.
We present a new primitive--Append-only Signatures (AOS)--with the property that any party given an AOS signature aossig[M_1] on message M_1 can compute aossig[M_1||M_2] for any message M_2, where M_1||M_2 is the concatenation of M_1 and M_2. We define the security of AOS, present concrete AOS schemes, and prove their security under standard assumptions. In addition, we find that despite its simple definition, AOS is equivalent to Hierarchical Identity-based Signatures (HIBS) through efficient and security-preserving reductions. Finally, we show direct applications of AOS to problems in network security. Our investigations indicate that AOS is both useful in practical applications and worthy of further study as a cryptographic primitive.