International Association
for Cryptologic Research

We present a unifying framework for proving the knowledge soundness of KZG-like polynomial commitment schemes, encompassing both univariate and multivariate variants. By conceptualizing the proof technique of Lipmaa, Parisella, and Siim for the univariate KZG scheme (EUROCRYPT 2024), we present tools and falsifiable hardness assumptions that permit black-box extraction of the multivariate KZG scheme. Central to our approach is the notion of a canonical Proof-of-Knowledge of a Polynomial (PoKoP) of a polynomial commitment scheme, which cleanly captures the extractability notion required in constructions of practical zk-SNARKs. We further present an explicit polynomial decomposition lemma for multivariate polynomials, enabling a more direct analysis of interpolating extractors and bridging the gap between univariate and multivariate commitments. Our results provide the first standard-model proofs of extractability for the multivariate KZG scheme and many of its variants under falsifiable assumptions.