International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Shannon Veitch

Publications and invited talks

Year
Venue
Title
2025
CRYPTO
Hybrid Obfuscated Key Exchange and KEMs
Hiding the metadata in Internet protocols serves to protect user privacy, dissuade traffic analysis, and prevent network ossification. Fully encrypted protocols require even the initial key exchange to be obfuscated: a passive observer should be unable to distinguish a protocol execution from an exchange of random bitstrings. Deployed obfuscated key exchanges such as Tor's pluggable transport protocol obfs4 are Diffie-Hellman-based, and rely on the Elligator encoding for obfuscation. Recently, Günther, Stebila, and Veitch (CCS '24) proposed a post-quantum variant pq-obfs, using a novel building block called obfuscated key encapsulation mechanisms (OKEMs): KEMs whose public keys and ciphertexts look like random bitstrings. For transitioning real-world protocols, pure post-quantum security is not enough. Many are taking a hybrid approach, combining traditional and post-quantum schemes to hedge against security failures in either component. While hybrid KEMs are already widely deployed (e.g., in TLS 1.3), existing hybridization techniques fail to provide hybrid obfuscation guarantees for OKEMs. Further, even if a hybrid OKEM existed, the pq-obfs protocol would still not achieve hybrid obfuscation. In this work, we address these challenges by presenting the first OKEM combiner that achieves hybrid IND-CCA security with hybrid ciphertext obfuscation guarantees, and using this to build Drivel, a modification of pq-obfs that is compatible with hybrid OKEMs. Our OKEM combiner allows for a variety of practical instantiations, e.g., combining obfuscated versions of DHKEM and ML-KEM. We additionally provide techniques to achieve unconditional public key obfuscation for LWE-based OKEMs, and explore broader applications of hybrid OKEMs, including a construction of the first hybrid password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocol secure against adaptive corruptions in the UC model.
2024
RWC
Obfuscated Key Exchange
Censorship circumvention tools enable clients to access endpoints in a network despite the presence of a censor. Censors use a variety of techniques to identify content they wish to block, including patterns that are characteristic of proxy or circumvention protocols. In response to this class of blocking behavior, circumvention practitioners have developed a family of "fully encrypted" protocols (FEPs), intended to have traffic that appears indistinguishable from random. For such protocols to be effective it is crucial that one can establish shared keys and protocol agreement without revealing to observers that an obfuscated protocol is in use. Despite their social significance to millions of users, there is no formal description of security for this handshake phase. This talk recounts the development of the obfs4 handshake, a highly-adopted FEP used to enable access to the Tor network in censored regions, which has incurred an iterative design process in response to censor behavior. We then present concrete results from our work formalizing obfuscated key exchange, capturing the goals of these protocols concretely and analyzing the obfs4 design. We demonstrate how to extend the obfs4 design to defend against stronger censorship attacks and to make it quantum-safe. With our analysis in mind, we point to challenges that remain in modeling and improving upon obfuscated protocols for future work.