International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Anup Kumar Kundu

Publications and invited talks

Year
Venue
Title
2025
TCHES
ToFA: Towards Fault Analysis of GIFT and GIFT-like Ciphers Leveraging Truncated Impossible Differentials
In this work, we introduce ToFA, the first fault attack (FA) strategy that attempts to leverage the classically well-known idea of impossible differential cryptanalysis to mount practically verifiable attacks on bit-oriented ciphers like GIFT and BAKSHEESH. The idea stems from the fact that truncated differential paths induced due to fault injection in certain intermediate rounds of the ciphers lead to active SBox-es in subsequent rounds whose inputs admit specific truncated differences. This leads to a (multi-round) impossible differential distinguisher, which can be incrementally leveraged for key-guess elimination via partial decryption. The key-space reduction further exploits the multi-round impossibility, capitalizing on the relations due to the quotient-remainder (QR) groups of the GIFT and BAKSHEESH linear layer, which increases the filtering capability of the distinguisher. Moreover, the primary observations made in this work are independent of the actual SBox. Clock glitch based fault attacks were mounted on 8-bit implementations of GIFT- 64/GIFT-128 using a ChipWhisperer Lite board on an 8-bit ATXmega128D4-AU micro-controller. Unique key recovery was achieved for GIFT-128 with 3 random byte faults, while for GIFT-64, key space was reduced to 232, the highest achievable for GIFT-64, with a single level fault due to its key-schedule. To the best of our knowledge, this work also reports the highest fault injection penetration for any variant of GIFT and BAKSHEESH. Finally, this work reiterates the role of classical cryptanalysis strategies in fault vulnerability assessment by showcasing the most efficient fault attacks on GIFT.
2024
ASIACRYPT
More Vulnerabilities of Linear Structure Sbox-Based Ciphers Reveal Their Inability to Resist DFA
Amit Jana Anup Kumar Kundu Goutam Paul
At Asiacrypt 2021, Baksi et al. introduced DEFAULT, the first block cipher designed to resist differential fault attacks (DFA) at the algorithm level, boasting of 64-bit DFA security. However, during Eurocrypt 2022, Nageler et al. presented a DFA attack that exposed vulnerabilities in the claimed DFA security of DEFAULT, reducing it by up to 20 bits in the case of the simple key schedule and even allowing for unique key recovery in the presence of rotating keys. In this work, we compute deterministic differential trails for up to five rounds, injecting around 5 faults into the simple key schedule for key recovery, recovering equivalent keys with just 36 faults in the DEFAULT-LAYER, and introducing a generic DFA approach suitable for round-independent keys within the DEFAULT cipher. These results represent the most efficient key recovery achieved for the DEFAULT cipher under DFA attacks so far. Additionally, we introduce a novel fault attack called the Statistical-Differential Fault Attack (SDFA), specifically tailored for linear-structured SBox-based ciphers like DEFAULT. This technique is successfully applied to BAKSHEESH, resulting in a nearly unique key recovery. Our findings emphasize the vulnerabilities present in linear-structured SBox-based ciphers and underscore the challenges in establishing robust DFA protection for such cipher designs.