International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research


Sougata Mandal


Context-Committing Security of Leveled Leakage-Resilient AEAD
During recent years, research on authenticated encryption has been thriving through two highly active and practically motivated research directions: provable leakage resilience and key- or context-commitment security. However, the intersection of both fields had been overlooked until very recently. In ToSC 1/2024, Struck and Weishäupl studied generic compositions of encryption schemes and message authentication codes for building committing leakage-resilient schemes. They showed that, in general, Encrypt-then-MAC (EtM) and MAC-then-Encrypt (MtE) are not committing while Encrypt-and-MAC (EaM) is, under plausible and weak assumptions on the components. However, real-world schemes are rarely strict blackbox constructions. Instead, while various leakage-resilient schemes follow blueprints inspired by generic compositions, they often tweak them for security or efficiency.In this paper, we study two blueprints, the first one based on EtM for one of the strongest possible levels of leakage resilience. The second one is a single-pass framework based on leveled implementations. We show that, with a careful selection of the underlying primitives such as with identical encryption and authentication keys and a collision-resistant PRF as the MAC, these blueprints are committing. Our results do not contradict the results by Struck and Weishäupl since we pose more, but practically-motivated, requirements on the components. We demonstrate the practical relevance of our results by showing that our results on those blueprints allow us to easily derive proofs that several state-of-the-art leakage-resilient schemes are indeed committing, including TEDT and its descendants TEDT2 and Romulus-T, as well as the single-pass scheme Triplex.
FEDT: Forkcipher-based Leakage-resilient Beyond-birthday-secure AE
<p>There has been a notable surge of research on leakage-resilient authenticated encryption (AE) schemes, in the bounded as well as the unbounded leakage model. The latter has garnered significant attention due to its detailed and practical orientation. Designers have commonly utilized (tweakable) block ciphers, exemplified by the TEDT scheme, achieving $\mathcal{O}(n-\log(n^2))$-bit integrity under leakage and comparable AE security in the black-box setting. However, the privacy of TEDT was limited by $n/2$-bits under leakage; TEDT2 sought to overcome these limitations by achieving improved security with $\mathcal{O}(n-\log n)$-bit integrity and privacy under leakage.</p><p>This work introduces FEDT, an efficient leakage-resilient authenticated encryption (AE) scheme based on fork-cipher. Compared to the state-of-the-art schemes TEDT and TEDT2, which process messages with a rate of $1/2$ block per primitive call for encryption and one for authentication, FEDT doubles their rates at the price of a different primitive. FEDT employs a more parallelizable tree-based encryption compared to its predecessors while maintaining $\mathcal{O}(n-\log n)$-bit security for both privacy and integrity under leakage. FEDT prioritizes high throughput at the cost of increased latency. For settings where latency is important, we propose FEDT*, which combines the authentication part of FEDT with a CTR-based encryption. FEDT* offers security equivalent to FEDT while increasing the encryption rate of $4/3$ and reducing the latency. </p>
Cascading Four Round LRW1 is Beyond Birthday Bound Secure
In CRYPTO’02, Liskov et al. introduced the concept of a tweakable block cipher, a novel symmetric key primitive with promising applications. They put forth two constructions for designing such tweakable block ciphers from conventional block ciphers: LRW1 and LRW2. While subsequent efforts extended LRW2 to achieve security beyond the birthday bound (e.g., cascaded LRW2 in CRYPTO’12 by Landecker et al.), the extension of LRW1 remained unexplored until Bao et al.’s work in EUROCRYPT’20 that considered cascaded LRW1, a one-round extension of LRW1 - entailing masking the LRW1 output with the given tweak and re-encrypting it with the same block cipher. They showed that CLRW1 offers security up to 22n/3 queries. However, this result was challenged by Khairallah’s recent birthday bound distinguishing attack on cascaded LRW1, effectively refuting the security claim of Bao et al. Consequently, a pertinent research question emerges: How many rounds of cascaded LRW1 are required to obtain security beyond the birthday bound? This paper addresses this question by establishing that cascading LRW1 for four rounds suffices to ensure security beyond the birthday bound. Specifically, we demonstrate that 4 rounds of CLRW1 guarantees security for up to 23n/4 queries. Our security analysis is based from recent advancements in the mirror theory technique for tweakable random permutations, operating within the framework of the Expectation Method.