International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research


Ludo N. Pulles

ORCID: 0000-0002-8014-9221


Does the Dual-Sieve Attack on Learning with Errors even Work?
Léo Ducas Ludo N. Pulles
Guo and Johansson (ASIACRYPT 2021), and MATZOV (tech. report 2022) have independently claimed improved attacks against various NIST lattice candidates by adding a Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) trick on top of the so-called Dual-Sieve attack. Recently, there was more follow up work in this line adding new practical improvements. However, from a theoretical perspective, all of these works are painfully specific to Learning with Errors, while the principle of the Dual-Sieve attack is more general (Laarhoven and Walter, CT-RSA 2021). More critically, all of these works are based on heuristics that have received very little theoretical and experimental attention. This work attempts to rectify the above deficiencies of the literature. We first propose a generalization of the FFT trick by Guo and Johansson to arbitrary Bounded Distance Decoding instances. This generalization offers a new improvement to the attack. We then theoretically explore the underlying heuristics and show that these are in contradiction with formal, unconditional theorems in some regimes, and with well-tested heuristics in other regimes. The specific instantiations of the recent literature fall into this second regime. We confirm these contradictions with experiments, documenting several phenomena that are not predicted by the analysis, including a "waterfall-floor" phenomenon, reminiscent of Low-Density Parity-Check decoding failures. We conclude that the success probability of the recent Dual-Sieve-FFT attacks are presumably significantly overestimated. We further discuss the adequate way forward towards fixing the attack and its analysis.
Hawk: Module LIP makes Lattice Signatures Fast, Compact and Simple 📺
We propose the signature scheme Hawk, a concrete instantiation of proposals to use the Lattice Isomorphism Problem (LIP) as a foundation for cryptography that focuses on simplicity. This simplicity stems from LIP, which allows the use of lattices such as $\mathbb{Z}^n$, leading to signature algorithms with no floats, no rejection sampling, and compact precomputed distributions. Such design features are desirable for constrained devices, and when computing signatures inside FHE or MPC. The most significant change from recent LIP proposals is the use of module lattices, reusing algorithms and ideas from NTRUSign and Falcon. Its simplicity makes Hawk competitive. We provide cryptanalysis with experimental evidence for the design of Hawk and implement two parameter sets, Hawk-512 and Hawk-1024. Signing using Hawk-512 and Hawk-1024 is four times faster than Falcon on x86 architectures, produces signatures that are about 15% more compact, and is slightly more secure against forgeries by lattice reduction attacks. When floating-points are unavailable, Hawk signs 15 times faster than Falcon. We provide a worst case to average case reduction for module LIP. For certain parametrisations of Hawk this applies to secret key recovery and we reduce signature forgery in the random oracle model to a new problem called the one more short vector problem.