International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Dirmanto Jap

Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2020
TCHES
DAPA: Differential Analysis aided Power Attack on (Non-) Linear Feedback Shift Registers 📺
Differential power analysis (DPA) is a form of side-channel analysis (SCA) that performs statistical analysis on the power traces of cryptographic computations. DPA is applicable to many cryptographic primitives, including block ciphers, stream ciphers and even hash-based message authentication code (HMAC). At COSADE 2017, Dobraunig et al. presented a DPA on the fresh re-keying scheme Keymill to extract the bit relations of neighbouring bits in its shift registers, reducing the internal state guessing space from 128 to 4 bits. In this work, we generalise their methodology and combine with differential analysis, we called it differential analysis aided power attack (DAPA), to uncover more bit relations and take into account the linear or non-linear functions that feedback to the shift registers (i.e. LFSRs or NLFSRs). Next, we apply our DAPA on LR-Keymill, the improved version of Keymill designed to resist the aforementioned DPA, and breaks its 67.9-bit security claim with a 4-bit internal state guessing. We experimentally verified our analysis. In addition, we improve the previous DPA on Keymill by halving the amount of data resources needed for the attack. We also applied our DAPA to Trivium, a hardware-oriented stream cipher from the eSTREAM portfolio and reduces the key guessing space from 80 to 14 bits.
2019
TCHES
SITM: See-In-The-Middle Side-Channel Assisted Middle Round Differential Cryptanalysis on SPN Block Ciphers 📺
Side-channel analysis constitutes a powerful attack vector against cryptographic implementations. Techniques such as power and electromagnetic side-channel analysis have been extensively studied to provide an efficient way to recover the secret key used in cryptographic algorithms. To protect against such attacks, countermeasure designers have developed protection methods, such as masking and hiding, to make the attacks harder. However, due to significant overheads, these protections are sometimes deployed only at the beginning and the end of encryption, which are the main targets for side-channel attacks.In this paper, we present a methodology for side-channel assisted differential cryptanalysis attack to target middle rounds of block cipher implementations. Such method presents a powerful attack vector against designs that normally only protect the beginning and end rounds of ciphers. We generalize the attack to SPN based ciphers and calculate the effort the attacker needs to recover the secret key. We provide experimental results on 8-bit and 32-bit microcontrollers. We provide case studies on state-of-the-art symmetric block ciphers, such as AES, SKINNY, and PRESENT. Furthermore, we show how to attack shuffling-protected implementations.
2017
TOSC
Practical Evaluation of FSE 2016 Customized Encoding Countermeasure
To protect against side-channel attacks, many countermeasures have been proposed. A novel customized encoding countermeasure was published in FSE 2016. Customized encoding exploits knowledge of the profiled leakage of the device to construct an optimal encoding and minimize the overall side-channel leakage. This technique was originally applied on a basic table look-up. In this paper, we implement a full block cipher with customized encoding countermeasure and investigate its security under simulated and practical setting for a general purpose microcontroller. Under simulated setting, we can verify that customized encoding shows strong security properties under proper assumption of leakage estimation and noise variance. However, in practical setting, our general observation is that the side-channel leakage will mostly be present even if the encoding scheme is applied, highlighting some limitation of the approach. The results are supported by experiments on 8-bit AVR and 32-bit ARM microcontroller.