International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research


Claire Delaplace


Revisiting and Improving Algorithms for the 3XOR Problem
The 3SUM problem is a well-known problem in computer science and many geometric problems have been reduced to it. We study the 3XOR variant which is more cryptologically relevant. In this problem, the attacker is given black-box access to three random functions F,G and H and she has to find three inputs x, y and z such that F(x) ⊕ G(y) ⊕ H(z) = 0. The 3XOR problem is a difficult case of the more-general k-list birthday problem. Wagner’s celebrated k-list birthday algorithm, and the ones inspired by it, work by querying the functions more than strictly necessary from an information-theoretic point of view. This gives some leeway to target a solution of a specific form, at the expense of processing a huge amount of data. However, to handle such a huge amount of data can be very difficult in practice. This is why we first restricted our attention to solving the 3XOR problem for which the total number of queries to F, G and H is minimal. If they are n-bit random functions, it is possible to solve the problem with roughly
LWE Without Modular Reduction and Improved Side-Channel Attacks Against BLISS
This paper is devoted to analyzing the variant of Regev’s learning with errors (LWE) problem in which modular reduction is omitted: namely, the problem (ILWE) of recovering a vector $$\mathbf {s}\in \mathbb {Z}^n$$ given polynomially many samples of the form $$(\mathbf {a},\langle \mathbf {a},\mathbf {s}\rangle + e)\in \mathbb {Z}^{n+1}$$ where $$\mathbf { a}$$ and e follow fixed distributions. Unsurprisingly, this problem is much easier than LWE: under mild conditions on the distributions, we show that the problem can be solved efficiently as long as the variance of e is not superpolynomially larger than that of $$\mathbf { a}$$. We also provide almost tight bounds on the number of samples needed to recover $$\mathbf {s}$$.Our interest in studying this problem stems from the side-channel attack against the BLISS lattice-based signature scheme described by Espitau et al. at CCS 2017. The attack targets a quadratic function of the secret that leaks in the rejection sampling step of BLISS. The same part of the algorithm also suffers from a linear leakage, but the authors claimed that this leakage could not be exploited due to signature compression: the linear system arising from it turns out to be noisy, and hence key recovery amounts to solving a high-dimensional problem analogous to LWE, which seemed infeasible. However, this noisy linear algebra problem does not involve any modular reduction: it is essentially an instance of ILWE, and can therefore be solved efficiently using our techniques. This allows us to obtain an improved side-channel attack on BLISS, which applies to 100% of secret keys (as opposed to $${\approx }7\%$$ in the CCS paper), and is also considerably faster.