## CryptoDB

### Srimanta Bhattacharya

#### Publications

**Year**

**Venue**

**Title**

2021

ASIACRYPT

Luby-Rackoff Backwards with More Users and More Security
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Abstract

It is known, from the work of Dai \textit{et al.} (in CRYPTO'17), that the PRF advantage of $\xorp$ (bitwise-xor of two outputs of $n$-bit random permutations with domain separated inputs), against an adversary making $q$ queries, is about $q/2^n$ for $q \leq 2^{n- 5}$. The same bound can be easily shown to hold for $\xorp[k]$ (bitwise-xor of $k$ outputs $n$-bit pseudorandom random permutations with domain separated inputs), for $k \geq 3$.
In this work, we first consider multi-user security of $\xorp[3]$. We show that the multi-user PRF advantage of $\xorp[3]$ is about $\sqrt{uq_{\max}}/2^n$ for all {$q_{\max} \leq 2^{n}/12$}, where $u$ is the number of users and $q_{\max}$ is the maximum number of queries the adversary can make to each user. In the multi-user setup, this implies that $\xorp[3]$ gives security for $O(2^n)$ users even allowing almost $O(2^n)$ queries to each user. This also indicates significant improvement in the single-user setup ({\em i.e.,} when $u =1$), where the distinguishing advantage of the adversary even after making $O(2^n)$ queries is $O({1 \over \sqrt{2^n}})$, {\em i.e.,} negligible. Subsequently, we consider a simple efficient variant of $\xorp[3]$ in which we use five calls to produce $2n$ bit output (instead of six calls in the case of $\xorp[3]$). This variant also achieves similar level of security. As an immediate application, we can construct a variant of block cipher based counter mode which provides much higher security (both in the single-user and the multi-user setup) compared to the security of the encryption part of GCM at the cost of efficiency.

2018

TOSC

Revisiting Variable Output Length XOR Pseudorandom Function
Abstract

Let Ď be some positive integer and C â {(i, j) : 1 â¤ i < j â¤ Ď}. The theory behind finding a lower bound on the number of distinct blocks P1, . . . , PĎ â {0, 1}n satisfying a set of linear equations {Pi âPj = ci,j : (i, j) â C} for some ci,j â {0, 1}n, is called mirror theory. Patarin introduced the mirror theory and provided a proof for this. However, the proof, even for a special class of equations, is complex and contains several non-trivial gaps. As an application of mirror theory, XORP[w] (known as XOR construction) returning (wâ1) block output, is a pseudorandom function (PRF) for some parameter w, called width. The XOR construction can be seen as a basic structure of some encryption algorithms, e.g., the CENC encryption and the CHM authenticated encryption, proposed by Iwata in 2006. Due to potential application of XORP[w] and the nontrivial gaps in the proof of mirror theory, an alternative simpler analysis of PRF-security of XORP[w] would be much desired. Recently (in Crypto 2017) Dai et al. introduced a tool, called the Ď2 method, for analyzing PRF-security. Using this tool, the authors have provided a proof of PRF-security of XORP[2] without relying on the mirror theory. In this paper, we resolve the general case; we apply the Ď2 method to obtain a simpler security proof of XORP[w] for any w âĽ 2. For w = 2, we obtain a tighter bound for a wider range of parameters than that of Dai et al.. Moreover, we consider variable width construction XORP[â] (in which the widths are chosen by adversaries adaptively), and also provide variable output length pseudorandom function (VOLPRF) security analysis for it. As an application of VOLPRF, we propose an authenticated encryption which is a simple variant of CHM or AES-GCM and provides much higher security than those at the cost of one extra blockcipher call for every message.

2018

EUROCRYPT

#### Coauthors

- Srimanta Bhattacharya (3)
- Mridul Nandi (3)