IACR News item: 06 June 2025
Pedro Branco, Matthew Green, Aditya Hegde, Abhishek Jain, Gabriel Kaptchuk
ePrint Report
We study the problem of combating *viral* misinformation campaigns in end-to-end encrypted (E2EE) messaging systems such as WhatsApp. We propose a new notion of Hop Tracking Signatures (HTS) that allows for tracing originators of messages that have been propagated on long forwarding paths (i.e., gone viral), while preserving anonymity of everyone else. We define security for HTS against malicious servers.
We present both negative and positive results for HTS: on the one hand, we show that HTS does not admit succinct constructions if tracing and anonymity thresholds differ by exactly one "hop". On the other hand, by allowing for a larger gap between tracing and anonymity thresholds, we can build succinct HTS schemes where the signature size does not grow with the forwarding path. Our positive result relies on streaming algorithms and strong cryptographic assumptions.
Prior works on tracing within E2EE messaging systems either do not achieve security against malicious servers or focus only on tracing originators of pre-defined banned content.
We present both negative and positive results for HTS: on the one hand, we show that HTS does not admit succinct constructions if tracing and anonymity thresholds differ by exactly one "hop". On the other hand, by allowing for a larger gap between tracing and anonymity thresholds, we can build succinct HTS schemes where the signature size does not grow with the forwarding path. Our positive result relies on streaming algorithms and strong cryptographic assumptions.
Prior works on tracing within E2EE messaging systems either do not achieve security against malicious servers or focus only on tracing originators of pre-defined banned content.
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