International Association
for Cryptologic Research

Recently, Ateniese et al. (CRYPTO 2019) proposed a new cryptographic primitive called matchmaking encryption (ME), which provides fine-grained access control over encrypted data by allowing both the sender and receiver to specify access control policies. The encrypted message can be decrypted correctly if and only if the attributes of the sender and receiver simultaneously meet each other's specified policies. In current ME, when users from different organizations need secret communication, they need to be managed by a single-authority center. However, it is more reasonable if users from different domains obtain secret keys from their own authority centers, respectively. Inspired by this, we extend ME to cross-domain scenarios. Specifically, we introduce the concept of the cross-domain ME and instantiate it in the identity-based setting (i.e., cross-domain identity-based ME). Then, we first formulate and design a cross-domain identity-based ME (IB-ME) scheme and prove its privacy and authenticity in the random oracle model. Further, we extend the cross-domain IB-ME to the multi-receiver setting and give the formal definition, concrete scheme and security proof. Finally, we analyze and implement the schemes, which confirms the efficiency feasibility.