IACR News item: 07 January 2016
Jan Camenisch, Robert R. Enderlein, Victor Shoup
ePrint Report
We present a set of new, efficient, universally composable
two-party protocols for evaluating
reactive arithmetic circuits modulo n,
where n is a safe RSA modulus of unknown factorization.
Our protocols are based on
a homomorphic encryption scheme with message space $Z_n$,
zero-knowledge proofs of existence,
and a novel "mixed" trapdoor commitment scheme.
Our protocols are proven
secure against adaptive corruptions
(assuming secure erasures) under standard assumptions
in the CRS model (without random oracles).
Our protocols appear to be the most efficient ones
that satisfy these security requirements.
In contrast to prior protocols, we provide facilities that allow for the use of our protocols
as building blocks of higher-level protocols.
An additional contribution of this paper is a universally
composable construction of the variant of the Dodis-Yampolskiy
oblivious pseudorandom function in a group of order n
as originally proposed by Jarecki and Liu.
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