International Association
for Cryptologic Research

Slide attacks use pairs of encryption operations which are slid against each other. Slide with a twist attacks are more sophisticated

variants of slide attacks which slide an encryption operation against a decryption operation, and were used in 2000 to attack several cryptosystems, including DESX, the Even-Mansour construction, and Feistel structures with four-round self-similarity. They were further extended in 2012 to the mirror slidex framework, which was used to attack 20-round GOST and several additional variants of the Even-Mansour construction. In this paper, we revisit all the previously published applications of these techniques and show that in almost all cases, the same or better results can be achieved

by a simpler attack which is based on the seemingly unrelated idea of exploiting their internal fixed points. The observation that such fixed points can be useful in cryptanalysis had already been pointed out in 2007 by Kara, but all the examples he gave for his reflection attack were based on particular constructions such as Feistel structures or GOST key schedules in which it was easy to explicitly

list and count their fixed points.

In this paper, we generalize Kara\'s reflection attack by using the combinatorial result that random involutions on 2^n values are expected to have a surprisingly large number of O(2^{n/2}) fixed points (whereas random permutations are expected to have only O(1) fixed points). This makes it possible to reduce the complexity of the best known attack on additional cryptographic schemes in which it is difficult to explicitly characterize and count their internal fixed points.