IACR News item: 30 July 2014
Jiang Zhang, Zhenfeng Zhang, Jintai Ding, Michael Snook
ePrint Report
In this paper, we propose an authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol
from Ideal lattices. The protocol
is simple since it does not involve any other cryptographic primitives
to achieve authentication (e.g., signatures). This allows us
to establish a security proof solely based on the hardness of
the well-known ring-LWE problems, thus on some hard lattice problems in the worst-case (e.g., SVP and SIVP). We give the security proof of the proposed
AKE protocol in an enhanced variant of the original
Bellare-Rogaway (BR) model,
which additionally captures weak Perfect Forward Secrecy (wPFS),
in the random oracle (RO) model.
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