IACR News item: 24 July 2014
Juliane Krämer, Anke Stüber, Ágnes Kiss
ePrint Reportkeys of cryptographic algorithms.
By corrupting the computation of an algorithm, an attacker gets
additional information about the secret key.
In 2012, several Differential Fault Analyses on the AES cipher were
analyzed
from an information-theoretic perspective.
This analysis exposed whether or not the leaked information was fully exploited.
It revealed if an analysis was already optimal or if it could still be improved.
We applied the same approach to all existing Differential Fault Analyses
on the CLEFIA cipher.
We show that only some of these attacks are already optimal.
We improve those analyses which did not exploit all information.
With one exception, all attacks against CLEFIA-128 reach the theoretical limit
after our improvement.
Our improvement of an attack against CLEFIA-192 and CLEFIA-256 reduces the
number of fault injections to the lowest possible number reached to date.
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