International Association for Cryptologic Research

IACR News Central

Get an update on changes of the IACR web-page here. For questions, contact newsletter (at) iacr.org. You can also get this service via

To receive your credentials via mail again, please click here.

You can also access the full news archive.

Further sources to find out about changes are CryptoDB, ePrint RSS, ePrint Web, Event calender (iCal).

2013-10-05
15:17 [Pub][ePrint] SCARE of Secret Ciphers with SPN Structures, by Matthieu Rivain and Thomas Roche

  Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) is commonly used to recover secret keys involved in the implementation of publicly known cryptographic algorithms. On the other hand, Side-Channel Analysis for Reverse Engineering (SCARE) considers an adversary who aims at recovering the secret design of some cryptographic algorithm from its implementation. Most of previously published SCARE attacks enable the recovery of some secret parts of a cipher design --{\\it e.g.} the substitution box(es)-- assuming that the rest of the cipher is known. Moreover, these attacks are often based on idealized leakage assumption where the adversary recovers noise-free side-channel information. In this paper, we address these limitations and describe a generic SCARE attack that can recover the full secret design of any iterated block cipher with common structure. Specifically we consider the family of Substitution-Permutation Networks with either a classical structure (as the AES) or with a Feistel structure. Based on a simple and usual assumption on the side-channel leakage we show how to recover all parts of the design of such ciphers. We then relax our assumption and describe a practical SCARE attack that deals with noisy side-channel leakages.



15:17 [Pub][ePrint] Detection of Algebraic Manipulation in the Presence of Leakage, by Hadi Ahmadi and Reihaneh Safavi-Naini

  We investigate the problem of algebraic manipulation detection (AMD) over a communication channel that partially leaks information to an adversary. We assume the adversary is computationally unbounded and there is no shared key or correlated randomness between the sender and the receiver. We introduce leakage-resilient (LR)-AMD codes to detect algebraic manipulation in this model.

We consider two leakage models. The first model, called \\emph{linear leakage}, requires the adversary\'s uncertainty (entropy) about the message (or encoding randomness) to be a constant fraction of its length. This model can be seen as an extension of the original AMD study by Cramer et al. \\cite{CDFPW08} to when some leakage to the adversary is allowed. We study \\emph{randomized strong} and \\emph{deterministic weak} constructions of linear (L)LR-AMD codes. We derive lower and upper bounds on the redundancy of these codes and show that known optimal (in rate) AMD code constructions can serve as optimal LLR-AMD codes. In the second model, called \\emph{block leakage}, the message consists of a sequence of blocks and at least one block remains with uncertainty that is a constant fraction of the block length. We focus on deterministic block (B)LR-AMD codes. We observe that designing optimal such codes is more challenging: LLR-AMD constructions cannot function optimally under block leakage. We thus introduce a new optimal BLR-AMD code construction and prove its security in the model.

We show an application of LR-AMD codes to tampering detection over wiretap channels. We next show how to compose our BLR-AMD construction, with a few other keyless primitives, to provide both integrity and confidentiality in transmission of messages/keys over such channels. This is the best known solution in terms of randomness and code redundancy. We discuss our results and suggest directions for future research.



15:17 [Pub][ePrint] DFA-Based Functional Encryption: Adaptive Security from Dual System Encryption, by Somindu C. Ramanna

  We present an adaptively secure functional encryption (FE) scheme based on

deterministic finite automata (DFA). The construction uses composite-order bilinear

pairings and is built upon the selectively secure DFA-based FE scheme of Waters (Crypto 2012).

The scheme is proven secure using the dual system methodology under static subgroup decision assumptions.

A dual system proof requires generating of semi-functional components from the instance.

In addition, these components must be shown to be properly distributed in an attacker\'s view.

This can be ensured by imposing a restriction on the automata and strings over which the

scheme is built i.e., every symbol can appear at most once in a string and in the set of

transition tuples of an automata.

First a basic construction with the restrictions is obtained and proved to be adaptively secure.

We then show how to extend this basic scheme to a full scheme where the restrictions can be relaxed

by placing a bound on the number of occurrences of any symbol in a string and in

the set of transitions. With the relaxed restrictions, our system

supports functionality defined by a larger class of regular languages.



15:17 [Pub][ePrint] Differentially 4-Uniform Bijections by Permuting the Inverse Function, by Deng Tang and Claude Carlet and Xiaohu Tang

  Block ciphers use Substitution boxes (S-boxes) to create confusion into the cryptosystems. Functions used as S-boxes should have low differential uniformity, high nonlinearity and algebraic degree larger than 3 (preferably strictly larger). They should be fastly computable; from this viewpoint, it is better when they are in even number of variables. In addition, the functions should be bijections in a Substitution-Permutation Network. Almost perfect nonlinear (APN) functions have the lowest differential uniformity 2 and the existence of APN bijections over $\\F_{2^n}$ for even $n\\ge 8$ is a big open problem. In the present paper, we focus on constructing differentially 4-uniform bijections suitable for designing S-boxes for block ciphers. Based on the idea of permuting the inverse function, we design a construction providing a large number of differentially 4-uniform bijections with maximum algebraic degree and high nonlinearity. For every even $n\\ge 12$, we mathematically prove that the functions in a subclass of the constructed class are CCZ-inequivalent to known differentially 4-uniform power functions and to quadratic functions. This is the first mathematical proof that an infinite class of differentially 4-uniform bijections is CCZ-inequivalent to known differentially 4-uniform power functions and to quadratic functions. We also get a general lower bound on the nonlinearity of our functions, which can be very high in some cases, and obtain three improved lower bounds on the nonlinearity for three special subcases of functions which are extremely large.





2013-10-04
23:47 [Event][New] WiSec'14: The 7th ACM Conference on Security and Privacy

  Submission: 10 March 2014
Notification: 7 May 2014
From June 21 to June 25
Location: Oxford, England
More Information: http://www.sigsac.org/wisec/WiSec2014/


06:34 [Event][New] COSADE'14: Workshop on Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design

  Submission: 15 December 2013
Notification: 10 February 2014
From April 13 to April 15
Location: Paris, France
More Information: http://


06:25 [Job][New] Two Postdoc Positions, Technical University of Denmark, DTU

  Department of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science, Technical University of Denmark, www.compute.dtu.dk/english would like to invite applications for two Postdoc positions of each 18 months, both starting 1 January 2014 or soon thereafter. The topic of the project is lightweight cryptology, which regards scenarios involving strongly resource-constrained devices.

Candidates for the first postdoc position should have a strong cryptanalytic and mathematical background and be able to analyze the security of ciphers to be designed. Candidates for the second postdoc should have a solid background in hardware design and automation and be able to work on the physical constraints and optimization of the hardware implementations.

06:25 [Job][New] Lecturer in Secure Digital Systems, Centre for Secure Information Technologies (CSIT), Queen’s University Belfast, UK

  Applications are invited for Lectureships in Secure Digital Systems to undertake research in Data, Network and/or Malware security within the Centre for Secure Information Technologies (CSIT), which is part of the School of Electronics, Electrical Engineering and Computer Science (EEECS). Candidates will also be required to undertake lecturing duties at undergraduate and post-graduate level and to actively engage in major research with industry.

Applicants must have at least a 2:1 Honours Degree (or equivalent) in Electrical and Electronics Engineering, Computer Science, Mathematics or closely related discipline and a PhD, or expect, within 6 months, to obtain a PhD, in a relevant subject. Evidence of high quality research in a relevant field commensurate with stage of academic career, or extensive industrial experience in a relevant area, is essential. Applicants with research expertise in one or more of the following areas are strongly encouraged to apply: applied cryptography, side channel analysis, security protocols, malware/botnet analysis, network forensics, cloud security, threat and attack mitigation, insider threat behaviour, software security.





2013-10-01
21:17 [Pub][ePrint] Protecting Obfuscation Against Algebraic Attacks, by Boaz Barak and Sanjam Garg and Yael Tauman Kalai and Omer Paneth and Amit Sahai

  The goal of general-purpose program obfuscation is to make an arbitrary computer program ``unintelligible\'\' while preserving its functionality. At least as far back as the work of Diffie and Hellman in 1976, researchers have contemplated applications of general-purpose obfuscation. However, until 2013, even heuristic constructions for general-purpose obfuscation were not known.

This changed with the work of Garg, Gentry, Halevi, Raykova, Sahai, and Waters ({FOCS 2013}), which gave the first candidate construction of general-purpose obfuscation. The heart of their construction is an obfuscator for log-depth (\\textbf{NC$^1$}) circuits, building upon a simplified subset of the Approximate Multilinear Maps framework of Garg, Gentry, and Halevi ({Eurocrypt 2013}) that they call Multilinear Jigsaw Puzzles.

Given the importance of general-purpose obfuscation, it is imperative that we gain as much confidence as possible in candidates for general-purpose obfuscation. In this work, we focus on the following question: Do there exist \\emph{algebraic} attacks (a.k.a. generic multilinear attacks) against candidate constructions of general-purpose obfuscation? Indeed, Garg \\emph{et al.} posed

the problem of proving that there exist no generic multilinear attacks against their core \\textbf{NC$^1$} scheme as a major open problem in their work. Solving this problem will give us essential evidence that mathematical approaches to general purpose obfuscation introduced by Garg \\emph{et al.} are sound.

This problem was first addressed in the recent work of Brakerski and Rothblum (eprint 2013), who constructed a variant of the Garg \\emph{et al.} candidate obfuscator, and proved that it achieves the strongest definition of security for general-purpose obfuscation --- Virtual Black Box (VBB) security --- against

all generic multilinear attacks, albeit under an unproven assumption they introduce as the Bounded Speedup Hypothesis, which strengthens the Exponential Time Hypothesis.

In this work, we resolve the open problem of Garg \\emph{et al.} completely, by removing the need for this additional assumption. More specifically, we describe

a different (and arguably simpler) variant of the construction of Garg \\emph{et al.}, for which we can prove that it achieves Virtual Black Box security against

all generic multilinear attacks, \\emph{with no further assumptions}.



21:17 [Pub][ePrint] Combined Modeling and Side Channel Attacks on Strong PUFs, by Ahmed Mahmoud and Ulrich Rührmair and Mehrdad Majzoobi and Farinaz Koushanfar

  Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) have established themselves

in the scientific literature, and are also gaining ground

in commercial applications. Recently, however, several attacks

on PUF core properties have been reported. They concern

their physical and digital unclonability, as well as their

assumed resilience against invasive or side channel attacks.

In this paper, we join some of these techniques in order

to further improve their effectiveness. The combination of

machine-learning based modeling techniques with side channel

information allows us to attack so-called XOR Arbiter

PUFs and Lightweight PUFs up to a size and complexity

that was previously out of reach. For Lightweight PUFs,

for example, we report successful attacks for bitlengths of

64, 128 and 256, and for up to nine single Arbiter PUFs

whose output is XORed. Previous work at CCS 2010 and

IEEE TIFS 2013, which provides the currently most efficient

modeling results, had only been able to attack this structure

for up to five XORs and bitlength 64.

Our attack employs the first power side channel (PSC) for

Strong PUFs in the literature. This PSC tells the attacker

the number of single Arbiter PUF within an XOR Arbiter

PUF or Lightweight PUF architecture that are zero or one.

This PSC is of little value if taken by itself, but strongly

improves an attacker\'s capacity if suitably combined with

modeling techniques. At the end of the paper, we discuss efficient

and simple countermeasures against this PSC, which

could be used to secure future PUF generations.



15:05 [Election] IACR Election & Referendum - Please Vote

  The 2013 Election for Directors and Officers of the IACR Board and the Referendum on Bylaws Amendments are open from October 1st until November 15, 2013. All 2013 members of the IACR (generally, people who attended an IACR conference or workshop in 2012) should receive voting credentials from system@heliosvoting.org sent to their email address of record with the IACR on October 1st, 2013.