IACR News item: 09 May 2012
José Bacelar Almeida, Manuel Barbosa, Endre Bangerter, Gilles Barte, Stephan Krenn, Santiago Z
ePrint Reportface a daunting task. Not only must they understand the security
guarantees delivered by the constructions they choose,
they must also implement and combine them correctly and
efficiently.
Cryptographic compilers free developers from having to implement
cryptography on their own by turning high-level specifications
of security goals into efficient implementations. Yet, trusting such
tools is hard as they rely on complex mathematical
machinery and claim security properties that are subtle and difficult
to verify.
In this paper, we present ZKCrypt, an optimizing cryptographic compiler that achieves an unprecedented level of assurance without sacrificing
practicality for a comprehensive class of cryptographic protocols, known
as Zero Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge. The pipeline of ZKCrypt tightly
integrates purpose-built verified compilers and verifying compilers
producing formal proofs in the CertiCrypt framework. By combining the
guarantees delivered by each stage in the pipeline, ZKCrypt provides
assurance that the implementation it outputs securely
realizes the high-level proof goal given as input. We report on the
main characteristics of ZKCrypt, highlight new definitions and concepts
at its foundations, and illustrate its applicability through a
representative example of an anonymous credential system.
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