CryptoDB
Security Amplification of Threshold Signatures in the Standard Model
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| Conference: | TCC 2025 |
| Abstract: | The current standardization calls for threshold signatures have highlighted the need for appropriate security notions providing security guarantees strong enough for broad application. To address this, Bellare et al. [Crypto'22] introduced a hierarchy of unforgeability notions for threshold signatures. Recently, Navot and Tessaro [Asiacrypt'24] introduced a new game-based definition of strong (one-more) unforgeability for threshold signatures, which however does not achieve Bellare's strongest level of security. Navot and Tessaro analyzed several existing schemes w.r.t. this security notion, but all positive results rely on idealized models. This is in contrast to the weaker security notion of (standard) unforgeability, for which standard-model constructions exist. This leaves open a fundamental question: is getting strong unforgeability fundamentally harder than standard unforgeability for threshold signatures? In this paper we bridge this gap, by showing a generic construction lifting any unforgeable threshold signature scheme to strong unforgeability. The building blocks of our construction can be instantiated in the standard model under standard assumptions. The achieved notion of strong unforgeability extends the definition of Navot and Tessaro to achieve the strongest level of security according to the hierarchy of Bellare et al. (following a recent classification of security notions for (blind) threshold signatures by Lehmann, Nazarian, and Özbay [Eurocrypt'25]). The starting point for our transformation is an existing construction for single-user signatures from chameleon hash functions by Steinfeld, Pieprzyk and Wang [RSA'07]. We first simplify their construction by relying on a stronger security notion for chameleon hash functions. The bulk of our technical contribution is then to translate this framework into the threshold setting. Towards this goal, we introduce a game-based definition for threshold chameleon hash functions (TCHF) and provide a construction of TCHF that is secure under DDH in the standard model. We believe that our new notion of TCHF might also be of independent interest. |
BibTeX
@inproceedings{tcc-2025-36202,
title={Security Amplification of Threshold Signatures in the Standard Model},
publisher={Springer-Verlag},
author={Karen Azari and Cecilia Boschini and Kristina Hostakova and Michael Reichle},
year=2025
}