CryptoDB
How to Make Any Computational Secret Sharing Scheme Adaptively Secure
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| Conference: | CRYPTO 2025 |
| Abstract: | Secret sharing (SS) is a foundational cryptographic primitive with diverse applications, including secure multiparty computation and conditional disclosure of secrets. While traditional schemes have primarily emphasized information-theoretic security, recent advancements have increasingly leveraged computational assumptions to achieve more efficient constructions and support broader access policies. Despite these successes, most existing computational secret sharing (CSS) schemes are limited to a static security model, where adversaries must commit to their choice of corrupted participants at the outset. A critical challenge in CSS lies in achieving adaptive security, where adversaries can dynamically select participants to corrupt, better reflecting real-world threat models. In this paper, we present a novel transformation that converts any statically secure CSS scheme into an adaptively secure one, while preserving the original access policy and computational assumptions. Our construction introduces a multiplicative share size overhead of O(n^2) where n is the number of parties, providing a framework for bridging the gap between static and adaptive security. Additionally, we explore trade-offs in efficiency and security, offering more efficient adaptive CSS constructions for specific, restricted policy classes. This work addresses key limitations in the current landscape of CSS and paves the way for broader adoption of adaptively secure secret sharing in cryptographic applications. |
BibTeX
@inproceedings{crypto-2025-35690,
title={How to Make Any Computational Secret Sharing Scheme Adaptively Secure},
publisher={Springer-Verlag},
author={George Lu and Brent Waters},
year=2025
}