International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research


Correction to: Unconditionally Secure Computation Against Low-Complexity Leakage

Andrej Bogdanov
Yuval Ishai
Akshayaram Srinivasan
DOI: 10.1007/s00145-021-09417-9
Search ePrint
Search Google
Abstract: We consider the problem of constructing leakage-resilient circuit compilers that are secure against global leakage functions with bounded output length. By global, we mean that the leakage can depend on all circuit wires and output a low-complexity function (represented as a multi-output Boolean circuit) applied on these wires. In this work, we design compilers both in the stateless (a.k.a. single-shot leakage) setting and the stateful (a.k.a. continuous leakage) setting that are unconditionally secure against $$\mathsf {AC}^0$$ AC 0 leakage and similar low-complexity classes. In the stateless case, we show that the original private circuits construction of Ishai, Sahai, and Wagner (Crypto 2003) is actually secure against $${\mathsf {AC}}^{0}$$ AC 0 leakage. In the stateful case, we modify the construction of Rothblum (Crypto 2012), obtaining a simple construction with unconditional security. Prior works that designed leakage-resilient circuit compilers against $$\mathsf {AC}^0$$ AC 0 leakage had to rely either on secure hardware components (Faust et al., Eurocrypt 2010, Miles-Viola, STOC 2013) or on (unproven) complexity-theoretic assumptions (Rothblum, Crypto 2012).
  title={Correction to: Unconditionally Secure Computation Against Low-Complexity Leakage},
  journal={Journal of Cryptology},
  author={Andrej Bogdanov and Yuval Ishai and Akshayaram Srinivasan},