## CryptoDB

### Paper: Privacy-Preserving Authenticated Key Exchange and the Case of IKEv2

Authors: Sven Schäge Jörg Schwenk Sebastian Lauer DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-45388-6_20 Search ePrint Search Google Slides In this paper, we present a strong, formal, and general-purpose cryptographic model for privacy-preserving authenticated key exchange (PPAKE) protocols. PPAKE protocols are secure in the traditional AKE sense but additionally guarantee the confidentiality of the identities used in communication sessions. Our model has several useful and novel features, among others: it is a proper extension of classical AKE models, guarantees in a strong sense that the confidentiality of session keys is independent from the secrecy of the used identities, and it is the first to support what we call dynamic modes, where the responsibility of selecting the identities of the communication partners may vary over several protocol runs. We show the validity of our model by applying it to the cryptographic core of IPsec IKEv2 with signature-based authentication where the need for dynamic modes is practically well-motivated. In our analysis, we not only show that this protocol provides strong classical AKE security guarantees but also that the identities that are used by the parties remain hidden in successful protocol runs. Historically, the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol was the first real-world AKE to incorporate privacy-preserving techniques. However, lately privacy-preserving techniques have gained renewed interest in the design process of important protocols like TLS 1.3 (with encrypted SNI) and NOISE. We believe that our new model can be a solid foundation to analyze these and other practical protocols with respect to their privacy guarantees, in particular, in the now so wide-spread scenario where multiple virtual servers are hosted on a single machine.
##### BibTeX
@article{pkc-2020-30322,
title={Privacy-Preserving Authenticated Key Exchange and the Case of IKEv2},
booktitle={Public-Key Cryptography – PKC 2020},
series={Public-Key Cryptography – PKC 2020},
publisher={Springer},
volume={12111},
pages={567-596},
doi={10.1007/978-3-030-45388-6_20},
author={Sven Schäge and Jörg Schwenk and Sebastian Lauer},
year=2020
}