CryptoDB
M&M: Masks and Macs against Physical Attacks
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| Abstract: | Cryptographic implementations on embedded systems need to be protected against physical attacks. Today, this means that apart from incorporating countermeasures against side-channel analysis, implementations must also withstand fault attacks and combined attacks. Recent proposals in this area have shown that there is a big tradeoff between the implementation cost and the strength of the adversary model. In this work, we introduce a new combined countermeasure M&M that combines Masking with information-theoretic MAC tags and infective computation. It works in a stronger adversary model than the existing scheme ParTI, yet is a lot less costly to implement than the provably secure MPC-based scheme CAPA. We demonstrate M&M with a SCA- and DFA-secure implementation of the AES block cipher. We evaluate the side-channel leakage of the second-order secure design with a non-specific t-test and use simulation to validate the fault resistance. |
Video from TCHES 2019
BibTeX
@article{tches-2019-29040,
title={M&M: Masks and Macs against Physical Attacks},
journal={IACR Trans. Cryptogr. Hardw. Embed. Syst.},
publisher={Ruhr-Universität Bochum},
volume={2019, Issue 1},
pages={25-50},
url={https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/7333},
doi={10.13154/tches.v2019.i1.25-50},
author={Lauren De Meyer and Victor Arribas and Svetla Nikova and Ventzislav Nikov and Vincent Rijmen},
year=2019
}