CryptoDB
Fine-Grained Secure Computation
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| Conference: | TCC 2018 |
| Abstract: | This paper initiates a study of Fine Grained Secure Computation: i.e. the construction of secure computation primitives against “moderately complex” adversaries. We present definitions and constructions for compact Fully Homomorphic Encryption and Verifiable Computation secure against (non-uniform) $$\mathsf {NC}^1$$ adversaries. Our results do not require the existence of one-way functions and hold under a widely believed separation assumption, namely $$\mathsf {NC}^{1}\subsetneq \oplus \mathsf {L}/ {\mathsf {poly}}$$ . We also present two application scenarios for our model: (i) hardware chips that prove their own correctness, and (ii) protocols against rational adversaries potentially relevant to the Verifier’s Dilemma in smart-contracts transactions such as Ethereum. |
BibTeX
@inproceedings{tcc-2018-29029,
title={Fine-Grained Secure Computation},
booktitle={Theory of Cryptography},
series={Theory of Cryptography},
publisher={Springer},
volume={11240},
pages={66-97},
doi={10.1007/978-3-030-03810-6_3},
author={Matteo Campanelli and Rosario Gennaro},
year=2018
}