CryptoDB
Obtaining a secure and efficient key agreement protocol from (H)MQV and NAXOS
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Abstract: | LaMacchia, Lauter and Mityagin recently presented a strong security definition for authenticated key agreement strengthening the well-known Canetti-Krawczyk definition. They also described a protocol, called NAXOS, that enjoys a simple security proof in the new model. Compared to MQV and HMQV, NAXOS is less efficient and cannot be readily modified to obtain a one-pass protocol. On the other hand MQV does not have a security proof, and the HMQV security proof is extremely complicated. This paper proposes a new authenticated key agreement protocol, called CMQV (`Combined' MQV), which incorporates design principles from MQV, HMQV and NAXOS. The new protocol achieves the efficiency of HMQV and admits a natural one-pass variant. Moreover, we present a simple and intuitive proof that CMQV is secure in the LaMacchia-Lauter-Mityagin model. |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2007-13405, title={Obtaining a secure and efficient key agreement protocol from (H)MQV and NAXOS}, booktitle={IACR Eprint archive}, keywords={cryptographic protocols / key agreement protocols, provable security, MQV, Diffie-Hellman}, url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2007/123}, note={ bustaogl@math.uwaterloo.ca 13649 received 28 Mar 2007, last revised 16 May 2007}, author={Berkant Ustaoglu}, year=2007 }