International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research


Paper: Errors in Computational Complexity Proofs for Protocols

Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo
Colin Boyd
Yvonne Hitchcock
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Abstract: Proofs are invaluable tools in assuring protocol implementers about the security properties of protocols. However, several instances of undetected flaws in the proofs of protocols (resulting in flawed protocols) undermine the credibility of provably-secure protocols. In this work, we examine several protocols with claimed proofs of security by Boyd & Gonzalez Nieto (2003), Jakobsson & Pointcheval (2001), and Wong & Chan (2001), and an authenticator by Bellare, Canetti, & Krawczyk (1998). Using these protocols as case studies, we reveal previously unpublished flaws in these protocols and their proofs. We hope our analysis will enable similar mistakes to be avoided in the future.
  title={Errors in Computational Complexity Proofs for Protocols},
  booktitle={IACR Eprint archive},
  keywords={Cryptographic protocols, Provable Security},
  note={The abridged version of this paper is going to appear in the proceedings of Asiacrypt 2005, LNCS 3788/2005 (pp. 624--643). 13062 received 3 Oct 2005, last revised 6 Oct 2005},
  author={Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo and Colin Boyd and Yvonne Hitchcock},