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Security Proof of "Efficient and Leakage-Resilient Authenticated Key Transport Protocol Based on RSA"
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Abstract: | In this paper, we prove the security of the {\sf RSA-AKE} protocol \cite{SKI05} in the random oracle model. The proof states that the {\sf RSA-AKE} protocol is secure against an adversary who gets the client's stored secret \emph{or} the server's RSA private key.\footnote{The protocol is the same as \cite{SKI05}, but we corrected the security proof partially. The attacks appeared in \cite{TM05} are no longer available in the proof since the adversary has access to either the client's stored secret or the server's private key, not both of them.} To our best knowledge, the {\sf RSA-AKE} protocol is the most efficient among their kinds (i.e., RSA and password based AKE protocols). The other security properties and efficiency measurements of the {\sf RSA-AKE} protocol remain the same as in \cite{SKI05}. |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2005-12526, title={Security Proof of "Efficient and Leakage-Resilient Authenticated Key Transport Protocol Based on RSA"}, booktitle={IACR Eprint archive}, keywords={cryptographic protocols / authentication, key transport protocol, password, on-line and off-line attacks}, url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2005/190}, note={ seonghan.shin@aist.go.jp 13283 received 23 Jun 2005, last revised 15 May 2006}, author={SeongHan Shin and Kazukuni Kobara and Hideki Imai}, year=2005 }