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Paper: Security Proof of "Efficient and Leakage-Resilient Authenticated Key Transport Protocol Based on RSA"

Authors:
SeongHan Shin
Kazukuni Kobara
Hideki Imai
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URL: http://eprint.iacr.org/2005/190
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Abstract: In this paper, we prove the security of the {\sf RSA-AKE} protocol \cite{SKI05} in the random oracle model. The proof states that the {\sf RSA-AKE} protocol is secure against an adversary who gets the client's stored secret \emph{or} the server's RSA private key.\footnote{The protocol is the same as \cite{SKI05}, but we corrected the security proof partially. The attacks appeared in \cite{TM05} are no longer available in the proof since the adversary has access to either the client's stored secret or the server's private key, not both of them.} To our best knowledge, the {\sf RSA-AKE} protocol is the most efficient among their kinds (i.e., RSA and password based AKE protocols). The other security properties and efficiency measurements of the {\sf RSA-AKE} protocol remain the same as in \cite{SKI05}.
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2005-12526,
  title={Security Proof of "Efficient and Leakage-Resilient Authenticated Key Transport Protocol Based on RSA"},
  booktitle={IACR Eprint archive},
  keywords={cryptographic protocols / authentication, key transport protocol, password, on-line and off-line attacks},
  url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2005/190},
  note={ seonghan.shin@aist.go.jp 13283 received 23 Jun 2005, last revised 15 May 2006},
  author={SeongHan Shin and Kazukuni Kobara and Hideki Imai},
  year=2005
}